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1. INTRODUCTION
[T]he economic landscape with which we deal is increasingly a
global one and... business conduct and transactions to
which antitrust law is applied are increasingly transnational.
But we enforce the laws within a framework that in many
ways was designed for a period when that was not the case.
The same is true of antitrust agencies in most parts of the
world.1
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law;J.D., University
of Illinois, Urbana, 1973; M.A., Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana,
1973; Ph.D., Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1975.
.. B.A., Economics, University of Virginia, 1996;J.D., University of Den-
ver College of Law, 1999; LL.M. (International and Comparative Law) candi-
date, Georgetown University, 2000.
1 Charles Stark, Antitrust in the International Business Environment, 27
N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 659, 665 (1995). Mr. Stark was, at the time of this
writing, the Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice. See id. at 659. Further, his assessment is
particularly accurate with respect to mergers in high technology, intellectual
property intensive sectors, where the relevant product and geographic markets
often become international via the mergers themselves. In the mid 1990s,
"headlines [had] been filled with stories of... mergers ... in the U.S. media
and entertainment industry, global integration of the telecommunications
market, and consolidation or growing concentration in biotechnology and the
computer software and hardware industries." Charles R. McManis, Intellec-
tual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
1283, 1284 (1998). In this environment, nation-based competition regulators
often fall into an internationalization assumption trap. Oftentimes, regulators
conclude that, as market concentrations must now be viewed on a world scale,
a merger establishing home-based market power concentrations is now of less
concern. Even the antitrust leadership seems susceptible to this assumption.
As Robert Pitofsky, current Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
noted "[m]ergers go through now that would have been challenged just 10
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The network effect is defined as the "increasing return in
value to the owners and participants in a network as the number
of members or components in it increases .,. ."' The network
effect, however, is becoming increasingly international- all the
while flying low on the antiquated nation-based antitrust radar?
While often viewed as a bounty for the consumer, rapidly chang-
ing technology and the network effect are often used as excuses
for monopolistic behavior. The traditional model of nation-based
antitrust regulation is not sufficiently sensitive to the monopolis-
tic implications of international network effects.4 Without a truly
years ago because competition now comes from all corners of the world." Id.
at 1283 (citing Leslie Wayne, Wave of Mergers is Recasting Face of Business in
U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1998, at Al). While it is true that competition now
comes from all corners of the world, it is difficult to realistically assume that a
nation-based antitrust regulator can validly assess the true anti-competitive im-
plications of a particularly "international" merger. The nation-based antitrust
position, as this article contests, is rooted in bias-regardless of what internal
safeguards are established. Through this biased regulatory lens, home-based
mergers that perpetuate anti-competitive effects elsewhere in the world mar-
ketplace are Itely to be given the benefit of the doubt. Two wonderfully ex-
plicit examples of this exact quandary are the British Airways/American Air-
lines case and the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case. See G. Porter
Elliott, Learning to Fly: The European Commission Enters Unfamiliar Skies in its
Review of the British Airways-American Airlines Alliance, 64 J. AIR L. & COM.157 (1998) (describing how the European Union ("EU") asserted questionable
jurisdiction over the transaction and in turn, regulated in a manner that pitted
European and British government officials and antitrust regulators against their
U.S. counterparts); Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's
Decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-
EU Cooperation in the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (describing
how U.S. and EU antitrust regulators took drastically different approaches to
viewing the transaction and the concomitant potential anti-competitive effects).
2 Kevin J. Arquit et al., Antitrust, Intellectual Property, Standards and
Interoperability, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1998, at 157, 162
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Hand-
book Series No. 524, 1998).
' The literature frequently recognizes this nation-based antiquation.
"Anti-competitive conduct within the borders of a foreign country no longer
solely affects the economy of that country; but its repercussions can often be
felt worldwide." James F. Rill, A Framework for Cooperation: The Status of In-
ternationalAntitrust Enforcement, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 321, 321 (1997).
4 The internationalization of the network effect is naturally forcing com-
petition regulators to attempt antitrust regulation on an international scale.
The Microsoft Corporation case is a textbook example of such an attempt. See
generally Allison J. Himelfarb, Comment, The International Language of Con-
vergence: Reviving Antitrust Dialogue Between the United States andthe European
Union with a Uniform Understanding of "Extraterritoriality," 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
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cooperative international vision of antitrust regulation, interna-
tional anti-competitive conduct will go unchecked and unregu-
lated. This article proposes a solution-embodied within the
structure of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")-to this
network-based international antitrust problem.
Antitrust law has historically operated based upon national
principles and focus. Business transactions, however, are increas-
ingly international in scope. The accelerated growth of informa-
tion technology is producing economies of scale which have fur-
ther driven the network effect. These factors combine to
establish an international business environment that must be un-
derstood through the perspective of international antitrust law.
The WTO, an established trade regulator on the international
scale, is the ideal body to establish this regulatory scheme.
International network effects can occur in many different in-
dustries. The rapid pace of technological innovation often blurs
once separate product markets into cohesive wholes.' Company
ECON. L. 909 (1996) (tracing the interactions of U.S. and EU competition regu-
lators in the handling of the first Microsoft case and arguing for a revival of
cooperation between the United States and EU in antitrust regulation). Him-
melfarb's analysis, by juxtaposing the Microsoft case, which substantively
turned on network effects issues, with the need for continued international co-
operation, underscores the growing internationalization of the network effect.
For a bibliographic synopsis of the entirety of the antitrust issues surrounding
Microsoft Corporation, see infra note 200.
' Particularly at the merger level, the internationalization of antitrust is-
sues is impossible to ignore; mergers with international effect occur practically
everyday. The mergers of SmithKline Beecham P.L.C. and Glaxo Wellcome
P.L.C. in the pharmaceutical industry and the proposed merger of British Pe-
troleum (which recently merged with Amoco) and Atlantic Richfield Corpora-
tion in the petroleum industry demonstrate the breadth of market and indus-
try coverage of internationalization. See Agis Salpukas, It's Ojjicial: BP is
Planning to Buy ARCO, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1999, at C5; Andrew Ross Sorkin
& Melody Petersen, Glaxo and SmithKline Agree to Form Largest Drugmaker,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2000, at Al.
Concomitant with the effects of technological innovation is a convergence
of geographic markets. Those at U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies recognize
the dificulties that rapidly changing technology presents to market definition
and antitrust regulation:
An increasing number of cases involve issues on the cutting edge of
some new technologies: innovation markets, standard setting, net-
work effects, market access, and new forms of competition. The chal-
lenge here is multifaceted. High tech markets pose some new and
novel issues for antitrust enforcers. Unlike traditional markets, these
are often markets with "winner take all" characteristics. Thus, the
key competition occurs at the stage of product development and in-
2000]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
A offers one distinct product in a distinct geographic market.
Company B offers a somewhat related product in a somewhat
overlapping geographic market. Company A buys company B,
merges their formerly separate products into one, and subse-
quently offers its new "single product" to both originally separate
markets. The product market changes to that of the new "single
product"; the geographic market expands to that of the original
product markets combined and generally becomes international.
Antitrust regulators view the two products as being in different
product and geographic markets. The newly merged entity pro-
duces the "new product" in an entirely new product market
without competition. The newly merged entity gains from "first
mover" effects and creates a "network" via the pervasive use of its
products throughout the expanding relevant market. The new
entity gains monopoly leverage, buying other entities and "merg-
ing-in" other products as it expands its network. The network ef-
fect settles in. At first, positive externalities ensue. However,
negative externalities develop given the lack of effective interna-
tional antitrust oversight.
The evolution of the broadcast-media conglomerate News
Corporation illustrates this development of network effects. Fly-
ing low on the antitrust radar, News Corporation continues to
purchase entities in transactions that do not trigger close national
antitrust scrutiny with respect to those entities' relevant product
and geographic markets. News Corporation combines these enti-
ties into a larger, more cohesive whole, then offers new products
that draw on the expanded network efficiencies. These products
occupy new markets in which News Corporation essentially cre-
ates and controls the product as the dominant or even exclusive
player. News Corporation thus offers a unique product via its
novation. Protecting competition at this stage involves some difficult
trade offs, especially since the agency does not want to suppress incen-
tives to innovate. The foal as antitrust enforcers is not to favor one
competitor or group o competitors over another. Rather, the objec-
tive is to ensure that the race is run fairly, that the course is level, and
that the rules are fair.
Anthony E. DiResta, Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission in the Bu.
reau of Competition, in 40TH ANNUAL ANTrrRUST LAW INSTITUTE 1999, at 85,
1093 (PLI Corporate Law Course Handbook Series No. 1117, 1999). DiResta's
discussion "substantially reflect[s] the comments by Mr. William J. Baer, Di-
rector of the Bureau of Competition, before the Bar Association of the City of
New York on November 17, 1997." Id. at 1085.
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constructed network. The News Corporation network, given its
control over key copyrighted content, makes the development of
a competing network extremely unlikely.
As quickly as News Corporation exploited inefficiencies in
the distribution of broadcast-media, it now appears poised to do
the same in the content market, establishing strategic distribution
partnerships in emerging delivery technologies. News Corpora-
tion is hedging its dominant position. News Corporation
strengthens its content market position partially via a strategy of
sports media purchases, ownership, and control. News Corpora-
tion realizes that while the network provider may be the front-
end "product" that a consumer purchases, it is the content pro-
vided by that network for which the consumer really pays. Par-
ticularly in a rapidly evolving and broadcast-media delivery mar-
ketplace, the entity that controls the content ultimately controls
the dial.
The perplexing scenario of News Corporation raises serious
public policy questions and problems. The News Corporation
scenario triggers the problem of trying to conceptualize the true
antitrust concerns raised by international business transactions.6
6 This Article employs economic analysis throughout its exposition in an
attempt to achieve an international conceptualization in both antitrust and po-
litical economy determinations. Such analysis gives a better understanding of
why nation-based antitrust regulation in the context of international anti-
competitive effect is ill-fated. This analysis exposes not only the true industrial
economics of a firm like News Corporation, but also sheds light on the regula-
tory motivations of an individual nation. While antitrust scholarship regularly
embraces the realm of economics, such use of economic theory ananalysis is
not the norm in international law scholarship-particularly that which deals
with international cooperation, an area of law upon which this paper directly
comments. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1999). Dunoff and Trachtman
identify why this may be the case:
While there may be many explanations for why international legal
scholars have not participated in the law and economics ("L&E") revo-
lution, we believe that many international lawyers would identify at
least one of the following three concerns: (1) L&E's seemingly inacces-
sible methodologies; (2) L&E's supposedly conservative political
prejudices; and (3-) L&E's positivism and its presumed denigration of
international law.
Id. at 6. Another author addresses, albeit from a somewhat different angle
from the one directly taken by this paper, the need to integrate legal analysis,
international relations theory, and economic analysis in studying the environ-
ment of international cooperation. See William J. Aceves, The Economic Analy-
sis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the Concept of State
2000]
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When one nation or jurisdiction makes an antitrust determina-
tion that is either contrary to others or is not in the best interests
of other affected nations, entities like News Corporation escape
serious antitrust analysis. Current national antitrust policies ei-
ther do not take into consideration or are ill-equipped to handle
these extraterritorial concerns.
Part 2 of this article sets out the economic landscape of global-
ization in the broadcast-media market. This section delineates the
expansion Of broadcast-media, from traditional television tower
transmission to direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") and digital serv-
ices. This section sets out the industrial organization economics
of different forms of broadcast-media, which have afforded News
Corporation the ability to exploit inefficiencies in the market-
place. Part 3 of this article takes a closer look at News Corpora-
tion- its history, corporate structure, operations, business strat-
egy, and the international antitrust issues raised by that strategy.
Part 4 presents a brief summary of the current international anti-
trust problem, underscoring not only the difficulties that current
nation-based antitrust laws pose to consumers, but also highlight-
ing a lack of predictability that may deter international com-
merce. This part then examines the various solutions proposed
by the current literature and applies them to the News Corpora-
tion dilemma. Part 5 proposes, using the News Corporation di-
lemma as a catalyst and the World Trade Organization as a foun-
dation, a new path toward international antitrust regulation.
This vision is one that focuses on respect for national sovereignty
combined with a recognition of the international nature of rele-
vant product and geographic markets. This proposal achieves this
goal by proposing that the WTO become the center for enforce-
ment of international competition law.
Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 995, 999 (1996). Aceves argues "transac-
tion costs affect all contractual arrangements, including the development and
operation of international institutions." Id. at 1003. This argument thus lends
an interesting level of critique to current approaches to international antitrust
regulation and the "international antitrust regulatory institution" proposed by
this Article. As this angle of discussion is more appropriately addressed on its
own terms, this paper employs Aceves's concept of "transaction costs" as an
additional tool of economic analysis in a subtext of footnote dialogue. See infra
note 259.
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2. THE GLOBALIZATION OF BROADCAST-MEDIA
When cable television emerged in the late 1940s as a pragmatic
solution to providing clear reception to those in rural areas,7 few
would have guessed that this simple and local solution would be
the ancestor to a global television market. The lineage of entities
like News Corporation, however, draws directly from the advent
of cable services. The birth of cable began the expansion of geo-
graphic broadcast markets, altering the broadcast product from
single-station broadcast availability to a broader concept- a
product "delivery package" constituting multiple stations. Cable
opened the door to consumer choice, which in turn forever al-
tered consumer demand and expectations. The expansion of this
demand to a global level was inevitable, only requiring entities
like News Corporation as catalysts. While News Corporation ac-
tively furthers and pursues the globalization of broadcast-media
markets, it succeeds in large part due to the underlying consumer
demand.
2.1. Cable Spawns Increased Consumer Choice
Early in its existence, cable was exploited by providers for its
expanded carry capacity. Not only did they provide the primary
stations that would be available in the delivery area, cable provid-
ers very quickly began to deliver more distant stations previously
unavailable in the delivery area.8 By 1958, broadcast stations in
the United States began to feel uncomfortable with the presence
of cable and, in turn, sought regulatory protection- eventually
gaining that protection via the Federal Communication Commis-
sion's ("FCC") must-carry regulations of 1962. 9 The competitive
environment surrounding the origination of must-carry regula-
tions was arguably one of speculative harm, not necessarily spe-
cifically documented harm. 1 The must-carry regulations still ex-
ist today in their current incarnation as part of the Cable Act of
1992.11
" See John E. Lopatka & Michael G. Vita, The Must-Carry Decisions: Bad
Law, Bad Economics, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 65 (1998).
8 See id.
' See id. at 66.
10 See id.
" Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
2000]
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(1994)). Lopatka and Vita describe the politically charged atmosphere that pre-
cipitated Congress's 'must-carry' regulations:
Congress saw more and more American households subscribing to ca-
ble television service, and it was alarmed. Once cable is installed,
viewers have little reason to maintain the apparatus necessary to re-
ceive over-the-air signals as well. For broadcast stations, therefore,
carriage on a cable system is economically significant, for it means ac-
cess to an ever-increasing portion of the viewing public, and audience
access is critical to the sile of their advertising time. But cable opera-
tors, who generally have local monopolies in the provision of cable
service, relused to carry some local stations and relegated others to
disadvantageous channel positions. Some of the stations affected
failed, others suffered, and Congress reasoned that most, if not all,
were in jeopardy. The looming specter, as perceived by Congress, was
the erosion of "free TV" and the loss of the local news and public af-
fairs programming it provides. So Congress acted to save free TV by
imposing cmust-carr' obligations on cable operators. Subject to cer-
tain qualifications, Congress required cable operators to carry the sig-
nals of local broadcast stations. Because these stations would then be
able to reach households connected to cable, they would thrive as
businesses and consequently remain available to unconnected viewers,
however shrinking the number of those viewers might be.
Now, this sketch of the must-carry rules provokes a number of ques-
tions. Why would cable operators refuse to carry local broadcast sta-
tions, given that subscribers tend to want that programming, and op-
erators want subscribers? Is the explanation nefarious, or does it have
to do with the natural effects of technological progress? How many
stations have been or will likely be denie[ carriage, and what kind of
programming do they provide? Will these excluded stations in fact
perish? Would they have failed anyway? Will stations carried on ca-
ble displace other programs? If they will, how should the interests of
subscriers who would prefer the dropped shows be taken into ac-
count?
Lopatka & Vita, supra note 7, at 61-62.
Lopatka and Vita's sketch resonates with the quandary now facing regulators
in the broadcast-media market. Similar to cable's redefinition of the primary
broadcast-media product from single-station to a package of stations, News
Corporation is altering the face of the broadcast-media product. As News
Corporation expands its distribution network (explained in more detail later in
this article), the prim broadcast-media product moves from a package of
services offered, tothedistributionsystem at ers an open-end of broadcast
possibilities. The more widespread the distribution network, the more de-
mand for a particular distribution product. For instance, a broadcast system
that offers the viewer expanded choice from a myriad of sports and entertain-
ment products is more valuable (in terms of consumer welfare) than a broad-
cast service that has limited, pre-set packaged selection. In essence, a consumer,
in selecting a broadcast service on the basis of choices available, is more apt to
select the broadcast service that has more "connections"- more likely the
broadcast service with a wider distribution network. In reality, the consumer
is picking a distribution network, not an end product. The distribution net-
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Regardless of the perceived restraint of the must-carry regula-
tions, cable growth has continued and, in the process, structurally
altered the dynamic of the broadcast-media market. 12 Individual
broadcast stations were forced to improve their product, facing
increased competition from the multiple broadcast services that
cable services offered. Cable emerged as a conduit, and with or
without must-carry regulations, cable provided those broadcast
products that consumers most desired.
In the United States, the cable industry historically has been,
and for the most part remains, the dominant local (non-global)
player in the broadcast-media industry, particularly in the market
for pay- TV services. 3 In other parts of the world, direct broadcast
satellite is currently the leading delivery system for pay-TV
broadcast-media. 4 In contrast to DBS's market share, cable pene-
tration in the U.S. broadcast-media market is extreme, claiming
close to an overall 70% market share."5 In the Telecommunica-
work is now the relevant product. The arena of competition changes, forcing
cable operators (who before did not necessarily have to compete) to be com-
petitive on the basis of not only price, but also selection. Just as cable opera-
tors engulfed single-stations into the new expanse of packaged broadcast prod-
uct, the current emergence of massive broadcast distribution networks is
engulfing the traditional cable operator. Where once before there existed a
myriad of local cable operators, now there is rising a new type of provider-
TCI, Time Warner, News Corporation-whether cable, digital, or satellite-
based, that competes using its integrated distribution muscle. Economies of
scope and scale shifted once before, with the emergence of cable, and they ap-
p ear to be shifting again. The questions that Lopatka and Vita pose, particu-
larly the one pondering the evolutionary "exclusionary" effects of technologi-
cal progress, are hauntingly relevant to the current competitive environment of
broadcast-media. Such questions naturally raise the issue of innovation market
theory, and, in the case of News Corporation, the potential for an essential fa-
cility. Both of these issues are addressed in more detail later in this article.
12 "Rather than a supplement to broadcast television, cable became an in-
dependent vehicle for providing alternative video services." Id. at 66.
13 See Reports Forecast Cable TV and DBS Markets through 2003,
MICROWAVEJ., Dec. 1, 1999, at 56; c.f Cable Transponder Revenue Could Drop
Because of Oversupply, SATELLITE WK., Oct. 4, 1999.
14 KEY NOTE LTD., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, KEY
NOTE REPORT CABLE AND SATELLITE TV (1996), available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Company & Financial File, at *25 [hereinafter 1996 KEY NOTE
REPORT] (noting that BskyB has a dominant hold on "subscriptions from
viewers" in the United Kingdom).
15 See Erin Arvedlund, ABC News, Little Dish Seeks Big Market Slice (vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/business/Daily
News/directtv990211.html> (noting percent broadcast market shares: satellite
TV 8.9%; broadcast TV only 21.1%; and cable TV 68.0%).
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tions Act of 1996,6 Congress, in conjunction with the FCC, seri-
ously attempted to remedy the underlying inefficiencies." It is
apparent, however, that only minor progress has been achieved in
stimulating more competition." Different regulatory maneuvers
have been employed in this fight. One promising method noted
in the literature is the concept of overbuilding- allowing new ca-
ble companies to build a new cable network in an already "built-
1 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
1 Prior to the 1996 Act, the FCC delivered a report to Congress summa-
rizing the dismal state of competition in the U.S. broadcast-media markets. See
Norman M. Sinel et al., Recent Developments in Cable Law, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1998, at 523, 598-99 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 523, 1998) (citing
In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Second Annual Report, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060
(1995)). Sinel noted:
The [FCC] concluded that cable television systems continue to domi-
nate the distribution of multichannel video programming in most
markets. Although some progress has begun toward a competitive
market place for the distribution of video programming, the Commis-
sion found that cable television systems today enjoy market power in
local markets.
Id. at 599 (emphasis added). Notable is the fact that Sinel mentioned Congress'
finding that cable enjoyed market power in local markets. While it is certainly
a jump, it is still a logical jump to conclude that either cable may not have held
such power in larger more global markets or in fact did not participate in a
more global market. Interestingly, Sinel further noted the FCC recognition of
continued competition from arguably more "global" competitors; "the Com-
mission found that, since 1990, competing distribution technologies [had] made
substantial strides to compete with cable. The Commission noted that in
[1995], DBS, MMDS, and SMATV systems [had] attracted many subscribers
away from traditional cable systems." Id. at 599-600.
11 See id. at 599-605 (presenting a brief overview of the sequence of FCC
broadcast-media market reports that followed the 1996 Act and documented
the progress of competition . In 1998, the FCC concluded:
[T]he local markets for video programming delivery remained"highly
concentrated and.., characterized by some barriers to entry and ex-
p ansion by potential competitors to incumbent cable systems."...
The Commission reported... that regional clustering of cable opera-
tions continued, and that the percentage of vertically integrated na-
tional programming services continued to decline (and stood at 40
percent).
Id. at 603.
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up" licensed area."' This method of inducing competition has
been somewhat successful.
In early years, U.S. cable providers primarily confined them-
selves to particularly small localities. By the late 1980s, however,
cable providers began to realize the economies of scale2' brought
on by larger cable networks. The economics of cable market en-
try are simple- high entry barriersY Spurned by favorable eco-
nomic conditions, where cable providers could no longer pur-
chase access licenses, larger cable companies began to buy out
local cable companies. Cable giants Tele-Communications Incor-
porated ("TCI") (recently purchased by AT&T), Comcast, Adel-
phia, MediaOne, z 1 and Time Warner Cable were all built in this
manner. Today, "local" cable companies no longer exist.
Concentration is expected as an industry naturally moves to-
wards the efficient level of production. What was not expected
in the case of cable was the reason for this consolidation- the ca-
ble industry's "race with telephone companies to offer high-speed
access to the Internet." 21 In fact, the potential for cable broadcast-
media to become competitive on a globalized scale rests solely on
the shoulders of this technological marriage- cable and the
Internet. The proposed merger between America On-Line
19 See id. at 606. Such new cable companies could very well necessitate
some sort of initiative by the local government itself. See id.
20 See id. at 606-23. Some courts have held that overbuilding in an already
licensed territory violates a cable company's franchise license rights and/or
equal protection rights. See id. However,
[t]he 1992 [Cable] Act dealt with some of these overbuilding issues.
The law prohibits a franchising authority from granting exclusive
franchises and unreasonably refusing to award an a ditional competi-
tive franchise. [The 1992 Act] also clarified the right of a municipality
to operate a cable television system and provided that a municipality
need not have a franchise to provide such a service.
Id. at 623.
21 "If average cost falls as output increases, [a] firm is said to have econo-
mies of scale...." DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANiZATION 59 (2d ed. 1994).
22 See 12 F.C.C.R. 16802 (May 8, 1997),available in 1997 WL 236317.
' A spin-off of U.S. West and recently subject to a bidding war between
Comcast and AT&T. See Geraldine Fabrikant, A T&T Makes Competing Bid for
MediaOne, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at C1.
24 See generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 21, at 36-37 (discussing
how mergers can improve efficiency in an industry).
25 Fabrikant, supra note 23.
2000]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
("AOL") and Time Warner,26 while primarily a U.S. market syn-
ergy, stands poised to take this globalized step. With Time War-
ner's extensive ownership of high demand content product, glob-
alization may not be far off for the merged entity. Broadcast-
media itself is moving ever closer to a complete integration with
cyberspace, an integration that will once again alter product and
geographic market structures. This integration will merely be a
by-product of a battle for the Internet itself; a battle which increas-
ingly forces cable companies to view the competitive marketplace
in the context of telephone companies, not DBS." This battle in-
herently changes the cost functions of cable companies, allowing
them to offer a wider selection of services, bringing in greater
capital influx. These changes are not only enabling cable compa-
nies to compete on a globalized scale; the changes are making it
more efficient for these companies to compete on a globalized
scale. DBS companies, while already positioned globally, are cur-
rently ill-positioned to take advantage of these economies of scope
due to the current technological limitation of satellite service.28
2.2. Emergence ofDirect Broadcast Satellite Service
The globalized product market implications of DBS service
have long been acknowledged. In 1969, the United Nations
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPOUS") stated
that DBS was a "means to 'unprecedented progress in communi-
cations and understanding between peoples and cultures."'29 DBS
globalization, however, has followed a much less noble path. The
space-based transmission of DBS dramatically altered the potential
geographic and product markets for broadcast services. Tradi-
26 Time Warner and AOL to Combine in $350 Billion Deal, COMM. DAILY,
Jan. 11, 2000.
2 Fabrikant notes, "As the only two industries that have communication
cables passing almost every house and business in the country, cable and tele-
p hone companies are positioning themselves to grab a share of the other's
business." Fabrikant, supra note 23.
2 "When it is cheaper to produce two products together (joint produc-
tion) rather than separately, there is an economy of scope." CARLTON &
PERLOFF, supra note 21, at 70.
29 Gerald A. Flaherty, Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Free Flow of Infor.
mation, A Canadian Perspective on Legal Implications of Direct Broadcast Satel-
lites (DBS) for North America 1 (Berlin Conference on the Law of the World
Work Paper 1985) (quoting the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/66 (1969)).
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tional transmission was always hampered by the limitations pre-
sented by transmitter capacity. Cable overcame these limitations,
yet was structurally stalled in expansion due to legislative and na-
tional boundaries. Cable was also somewhat limited on an aver-
age costing basis- it was prohibitively expensive on a per cus-
tomer basis to provide cable to those in remote areas or those
residing on highly inaccessible terrain.30 Once a cable network is
in place, adding additional customers within that network follows
on an economy of scale. For cable network expansion into an
undeveloped territory, however, a provider must physically out-
lay more cable. This expansion requires not only time and
money, but also government approval.
DBS overcame all of these limitations. Putting legal-structural
limitations aside, if a consumer was theoretically able to purchase
the necessary reception equipment, a DBS service was only lim-
ited by the broadcast window of the access satellite. Once a DBS
service goes "on-line," the marginal cost of adding new customers
more or less decreases with the addition of new customers. The
average cost curves of these three mediums, assuming perfect
competition is as follows:3'
30 As the International Chamber of Commerce notes, many areas in the
United Kingdom won't ever be cabled because of their relative isolation (and
the corresponding questionable economics of cable construction). 1996
KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at *7.
31 These cost curves are meant simply to be illustrative, based on a theo-
retical understanding of the broadcast-media marketplace. These graphs are
not intended to be precise representations based on actual or contrived
mathematical marketplace data.
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Direct Broadcast Satellite Service
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In each production function graph, point "L" represents the
maximum quantity (number of customers) allowable at the struc-
tural limitation point of the type of broadcast delivery, and point
"e" represents the universal point of global quantity (customer)
coverage. "Lmax" represents the maximum potential quantity
(customers) under the natural equilibrium price within that par-
ticular market structure. Price ("p"), average cost ("AC"), and
marginal cost ("MC") are detailed in each industry graph.
2.2.1. Traditional Transmission
In the context of traditional transmission, each point "L" rep-
resents the physical limitations of television tower transmission
and the legal barriers to further expansion. Each "L" varies with
transmitter power and coverage area. After these points, the price
to reach globalization effectively equals the cost of the transmit-
ters it takes to reach point "e." Particularly due to the low equi-
librium price,32 the costs to reach globalization become prohibi-
tive at an early stage.
32 This low equilibrium price is dictated by the relatively low cost of ob-
taining transmission, i.e., purchasing a television set. This cost is a one-time
cost and money that only indirectly channels back to the television provider
via advertising revenue. Thus, in a somewhat backward way, the price com-
manded by pure traditional television providers, for the purposes of the model
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2.2.2. Cable Provider
Cable providers face a somewhat different, yet, in the end,
reasonably similar predicament. Initial cost outlays focus on
building an initial network of cable in the licensed area. Costs
thus rise as additional customers are "added onto" the network.
Once a particular licensed service area network is "built out,"
however, the cost of adding additional customers mainly entails
advertising and hook-up. These costs are reduced on an average
basis with the addition of more customers based in the networked
territory.
Once full capacity is reached in a particular area, further ex-
pansion can only occur via a new territory license and subsequent
build-out of such area. The pattern repeats itself, with each point
"L" varying upon the size of the network addition. To maintain
current market share in the original jurisdiction, the cable pro-
vider must meet standard overhead costs (fixed costs), such as ad-
vertising, maintenance, labor, etc., which still figure into the
overall efficient scale cost equation. As such, the overall cost
curve has an upward trend, with the addition of new territories
and markets.
While a cable competitor can purchase pre-existing cable
groups in each major area of the country, the purchase cost is
prohibitive in a similar way to that of new network construction
and build-out costs. In that expansion context, purchase cost acts
much like the cost of setting up a network, as the valuation of the
purchase price is likely to account for the construction cost of the
network and associated goodwill. -Upon purchase, maintenance
costs are similar to that of building the network outright. In sum,
globalization is prohibitively difficult and, above all else, eco-
nomically inefficient.
2.2.3. Direct Broadcast Service
The production function graph for DBS services demonstrates
how the underlying industrial organization of a DBS service al-
at hand, is rather low. In reality, the price used in the graph is more a reflec-
tion on the generally lower revenue streams generated by traditional television
transmission providers. Lower revenue steams effectively limit these providers
from expanding on a more global scale. Simply put, it costs too much-spe-
cifically in the context of how much revenue a pure traditional transmission
provider can realistically raise.
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lows for globalization capacity. Initial cost outlays in starting a
DBS service are quite high. The number of broadcast windows
are limited,33 and licensing costs are high. Potential DBS service
providers must, of course, gain satellite access. Satellite access,
whether gained via an existing satellite or a new dedicated satel-
lite, is also a large start-up cost. Once the satellite network is in
place, however, cost outlays increase slightly, mainly due to in-
creased overhead as the customer base increases. In fact, a DBS
service does not incur any additional hook-up costs in adding cus-
tomers, and marginal cost decreases with the addition of new cus-
tomers because ground costs (accounting, advertising, manage-
ment, etc.) do not rise in equal proportion to the addition of
customers.
The initial network of DBS service provides an extremely
large broadcast window that can supply broadcast services to
more customers within a wide geographic market. Once a DBS
service reaches full service capacity in the initial network, it too
must build-out via new licenses and satellite service. To reach
globalization, however, additions are minimal compared to the
extensive network building costs associated with traditional
transmission and cable. The largest cost, obtaining initial satellite
service to the new network area, may only need to be incurred
two or three times before global build-out occurs. The revenue
streams from the higher price structure of the DBS product al-
lows the DBS competitor to more closely realize true globaliza-
tion. Also, next to the initial cost outlays, the fixed costs of
maintaining a DBS system are comparatively low because of low
maintenance costs and extensive service personnel are not re-
quired. Thus, a DBS cost structure allows a firm to 'produce' at a
global level.
" Unlike other uses of spectrum, which are available primarily on a first-
come, first-served basis, DBS spectrum is allocated on a per country basis. Via
the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), a finite number of DBS
slots have been allocated to each ITU member nation. As such, the United
States only has four DBS slots. In addition to the issue of limited slots, DBS
service also triggers the sensitive issue of content control, particularly in coun-
tries that sit under the DBS coverage area but object to that DBS content. See
Secretary-General, ITU Pekka Tarjanne, The Global Development of DBS and
Advanced TV Systems, Presentation at CNN/World Economic Development
Congress, (Sept. 20, 1992), at <http://www.itu.int/itudoc/osg/ptspeech/
chron/1992/cnn.txt>.
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2.2.4. Comparison Discussion
DBS cost structures34 have allowed competitors, like News
Corporation, to expand their market share. News Corporation
has focused its broadcasting delivery efforts primarily via the con-
struction of a DBS "network." The cable entities that News
Corporation owns focus solely upon front-end product creation
(news, sports, etc.) that merely feed into this network.
While cable services are catching up in terms of competitive-
ness, their increasing competitiveness is due only to their emula-
tion of what satellite services provide and the growing importance
of broad-band delivery pipelines. Modern cable service providers
are altering the economics of providing cable, but they still lack
total globalization- for now. Generally speaking, the broadcast
market is currently split into two categories: terrestrial, land-
based broadcasts to aerials connected to televisions; and non-
terrestrial, cable and satellite services.3" While the two categories
are generally considered separately for classification purposes,
they may be considered as one merged market for broadcast-
media product analysis, in which cable operators currently offer
an inferior product. DBS- at least for now- simply offers a
more profitable cost structure in a pure broadcast market. As the
next two subsections illustrate, however, that market structure is
changing in the climate of internet convergence.
2.3. Merger of Cable and Satellite Television Product Markets-
Case Study: the United Kingdom and BSkyB- A Prelude
to International Antitrust Concern
In many ways, the changing broadcast-media market struc-
tures are beneficial to News Corporation. The merger of the ca-
' DBS delivery presents benefits outside the assumption of a perfect mar-
ket. The primary entry barrier into the DBS service market is the limited
number of °sky sots" which are available. Governments, as per ITU alloca-
tion, can only offer a limited number of slots. See supra note 33. News Corpo-
ration did try to take advantage of this limitation, attempting to purchase the
remaining U.S. sky slot. Competition concerns arose, and News Corporation
sold the slot to EchoStar, one of the large players in the U.S. DBS market. See
Seth Schiesel, Local Signals May Be Costly for Satellite Providers, N.Y. TIMES, at
C1 (noting that the United States has a limited number of DBS orbital slots
and that NewsCorp sold its slot to EchoStar- the last slot available); see also
Daisy Whitney, No. 5 EchoStar's Orbit is High in the Telecom Industry, DENVER
POST, at D8 (explaining circumstances of sale to EchoStar).
" See 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at '125.
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ble and satellite television product markets has been prominent in
News Corporation's rise in power, specifically those in the
United Kingdom. The apparent merger of these markets, while
inevitable, was accelerated by News Corporation's U.K. DBS
service, British Sky Broadcasting ("BSkyB"). 3
There is some indication that the U.K. terrestrial and non-
terrestrial television markets are merging. As noted by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), "It]he commercial
[television] sector in the [United Kingdom] is facing chal-
lenges.., from both non-terrestrial commercial operators and
commercial digital channels."3" The ICC also noted that, "BSkyB
has the largest revenues of any single commercial television com-
pany in the U.K. market."38 BSkyB considers the relevant broad-
cast market to be all commercial broadcasters. 9 In light of the
1995 U.K. governmental proposal that no individual entity could
own more that 10% of the entire broadcast-media market (includ-
ing commercial radio and newspapers), it appears that the U.K.
government itself recognizes this media market convergence.
4
0
Even under this governmental constraint, the question of what
constitutes a single entity for antitrust purposes still arises, par-
ticularly in the context of News Corporation. There is a signifi-
cant and increasing concentration in the U.K. broadcast market
across terrestrial and non-terrestrial boundaries.41 More impor-
36 The power of BSkyB, and of News Corporation for that matter, rests
on its distributional muscle, as alluded to earlier. A more in-depth analysis of
this distribution network product will follow in the next section. For pur-
poses here, however, the understanding that BSkyB has an extensive verticaly-
integrated distribution network with News Corporation will suffice. This ar-
ticle delineates a historical and detailed structural analysis of BSkyB. See infra
Section 3.1.2.
31 KEY NOTE LTD., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, KEY
NOTE REPORT CABLE AND SATELLITE TV (1997), available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Company & Financial File, at *abstract [hereinafter 1997 KEY NOTE
REPORT].
38 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at *25.
" See BSkyB Says Cable, Satellite TV Viewing Share Hits 14.98%, EXTEL
EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 1999.
40 See 1997 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 37, at *17.
41 See id. ("The loosening of the existing rules covering ownership between
terrestrial TV operators, satellite and cable operators, commercial radio sta-
tions and newspaper groups has resulted in a wave of takeovers and acquisi-
tions .... Another important trend encouraged by the relaxation of media
ownership regulations is the sight of terrestrial companies moving into the
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tant to BSkyB's market power is that the difference in the United
Kingdom between cable and satellite services is blurry, particu-
larly due to the fact that most cable providers use BSkyB offerings
as central to their cable packages.42
The broadcast-media market is becoming highly elastic be-
cause consumer choice is driven by the quality and variety of
programming.43 Satellite television in the United Kingdom is be-
coming the choice over traditional cable services. As the ICC
notes, "There are many areas in the [United Kingdom] that will
never be cabled, due to their relative isolation and the question-
able economics of cable construction in such areas."' Due to its
aggressive strategy combined with its array of services, BSkyB has
become the "dominant player in the subscription television mar-
ket."4 There is some argument that cable may overtake satellite
television penetration in the subscription television market, "as
the cable television operators continue to build-out their net-
works."46 This wider penetration is partly explained because
"consumers who wish to access high-quality multichannel televi-
sion will often choose cable services in preference to satellite be-
cause of the much wider range of services that can be packaged
with a cable connection, not the least of which is cheap telephone
services."47 If this trend continues, BSkyB's dominance may
wane.48 At a certain point, however, build-out of a cable network
eventually becomes prohibitively expensive.
non-terrestrial market, either through mergers and acquisitions, or through
partnerships.").
42 See id.
" See id. ("[A]s the quality of programming available through terrestrial
television, funded only by advertising revenues, continues to decline, the ap-
peal of multichannel television will continue to attract consumers to the dish
option.").
44Id.
41 Id. at *38.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See id. at *25 ("As cable construction advances and terrestrial digital
broadcasting begins to offer viewers increased choice over the next few years,
perhaps without the high initial outlay, BSkyB may encounter increasing con-
sumer resistance to its product."); see also id. at 1138 ("For the foreseeable fu-
ture, the cable industry will remain heavily dependent on BSkyB for its most
attractive programming. However, it is not inconceivable that with terrestrial
broadcasters increasingy turning their attention to the subscription sector, a
new source of programming could emerge to rival the present BSkyB domi-
nance.").
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Most U.K. cable operators depend on BSkyB to fill their ros-
ter of channels.49 The cable operators often purchase BSkyB and
then resell the BSkyB product as part of a larger cable-ready pack-
age. Even if cable does gain a stronger foothold, BSkyB will still
control the key element- the market for the media product itself.
If viewers are driven by quality and variety of choice in media
content, then BSkyB's dominance should continue due to its
enormous bargaining power gained through subscriber revenues
and strength of distribution network that is already in place.5"
Subscriber revenues are not likely to decrease even if actual direct
subscriber numbers decrease because BSkyB is likely to charge ca-
ble operators on the basis of how many subscribers those opera-
tors service.
As broadcast mediums converge and substitutability increases
between those mediums, BSkyB's dominance apparently fades, at
least based on percentage share of a traditional delivery market.
Traditional antitrust product and geographic market analysis miss
BSkyB's extensively developed media distribution, marketing, and
support system- the content control market.51 While this struc-
ture is not the specific product that News Corporation or BSkyB
offers, it is the structure upon which new products in new mar-
kets are offered. BskyB, regardless of its form, is a driving force
in influencing whether people choose satellite dish service? Any
49 See id.
50 See 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at *25 ("The main source of
[BSkyB's industry leading revenue base] is subscriptions from viewers, in com-
parison to the terrestrial broadcasters which are heavily dependent on advertis-
ing revenues. This gives BSkyB a dramatic advantage when negotiating for
programme rights. The sums it can afford to pay for films and sporting events
are considerable.").
5" In an abstract sense, this "distribution network" is the type of vertically-
integrated network that usually raises interoperability concerns. See infra note
200.
52 See 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at *38.
BSkyB is actively seeking ways to make its services as attractive to con-
sumers as possible. Plans for new services include a tie up with BT (British
Telecommunications), to provide discounts on telephone bills, an Internet
connection that will offer home banking, video-on-demand and other in-
teractive services. BSkyB also holds the screening rights to some of the
most attractive television available to U.K. broadcasters.
Id. BSkyB has just launched its own interactive broadcast service, British Inter-
active Broadcasting (BiB), via digital satellite TV. See Waveguide Satellite News
British Interactive Broadcasting (visited Feb. 1, 2000) < http:/www.waveguide.
co.uk/447.htm >.
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product offered via BSkyB's distribution structure has a competi-
tive leg up, not necessarily competing on price or service quality.
For example, while the advent of digital television (satellite and
cable) promises to offer a vast array of new choices to consumers
and a challenge to traditional satellite television and cable, BSkyB
is already exploiting its strong distribution and marketing system,
offering its own digital satellite/terrestrial access television serv-
ice- SkyDigital."3 Even if digital cable makes inroads into
BSkyB's direct subscriber base, BSkyB's extensive distributional
and content strength and worldwide support via News Corpora-
tion, could help it maintain a dominant position. 4 These
strengths will allow BSkyB to parlay its former monopoly on de-
livery into a monopoly of control over the broadcast content it-
self.
2. 4. Mass Electronic Media Convergence
The broadcast-media market dynamic is again shifting. Indus-
try cross-breeding continues, obliterating formerly well-defined
lines between electronic mediums. A good example of this con-
vergence can be seen in the recent actions of the AT&T Liberty
Media Group. Liberty Media is owned and controlled by John
Malone, dubbed the "King of Cable." 5 Liberty Media, the largest
present shareholder in Time Warner Inc., which owns Time
Warner Cable, recently became the second-largest shareholder in
" See British Sky Broadcasting, Sky Introduces Digital Television to Britain
(visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http:7/www.sky.com/corporate/press/98jul dec.
html > [hereinafter Digital Television Introduction].
s1 See 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at *11. The ICC notes:
The main battle within the non-terrestrial TV sector is between
BSkyB and the principle cable operators. With the hold on the mar-
ket that BSkyB has, it is difficult to see how it can lose. As BSkyB is
the only major distributor of top-quality multichannel programming
packages, the cable companies are selling BSkyB television services
over teir networks. Effectively, this means that if BSkyB is able to
increase direct-to-home (DTH) satellite penetration, it will increase
subscription revenue from this source. However, as the cable opera-
tors build-out their networks, if they take market share away from
BSkyB dish subscriptions, the cable companies will sell BSkyB televi-
sion services to make their own service attractive to viewers.
Id.
" Karen Fessler, Malone Uses Midas Touch (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
< http://insidedenver.com/business/0408malo5.shtml >.
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News Corporation. 6 AT&T itself recently purchased cable giant
Tele-Communications Inc. ("TCe"). 7 The broadcast and elec-
tronic media feeding frenzy has begun. Malone noted to Karen
Fessler of Bloomberg News:
We're all out scouting in the woods for the right opportu-
nities .... Where Liberty is mostly to spend a substantial
amount of capital is in taking large positions on companies
who want to stay independent and who like a large and
friendly shareholder whose injection of capital would
dramatically improve its balance sheet and fend off hostile
suitors.58
Fessler added that "Malone has acquired minority stakes in
cable-programming and technology companies and is on the hunt
for more." 9 Malone and others like him (e.g., Rupert Murdoch)
undoubtedly exercise control over aggregating transactions like
these, despite the lack of technical shareholder control.
The lines between different video entertainment mediums are
blurring. As noted above, cable, satellite, and internet services are
merging into a single pathway of information and telecommuni-
cation services. AOL and TimeWarner recently announced their
intent to merge.' AOL has been increasingly concerned over
maintaining market share as increasingly more Internet users mi-
grate to broad-band providers. Time Warner Cable, which is one
of the leading broad-band providers in the Northeast, offers un-
paralleled portal access for AOL. Time Warner also offers dy-
namic proprietary content, which AOL lacks. Recognizing the
opportunity, Time Warner is now packaging itself more so as a
full service broad-band provider (that offers cable service as part
of a package) rather than merely a cable provider. The AOL-Time
Warner merger is commonly seen as paradigm shifting transac-
56 See Al Lewis, Liberty Media Ups its Stake (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
< http://insidedenver.com/business/0407lib1.shtml >.
57 Fessler, supra note 55.
58 Id.
59 Id.
o Time Warner and AOL to Combine in $350 Billion Deal, supra note26.
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tion." AOL-Time Warner is emblematic of the convergence rap-
idly occurring in media industries.62 News Corporation, recog-
nizing the potential challenge AOL Time Warner presents, is
now actively seeking its own Internet partners. News Corpora-
tion is currently talking with Yahoo and Microsoft, among oth-
ers, about potential minority investment stakes in News Corp's
satellite operations.63 Speculation in the industry is that Murdoch
is poised to respond." This epic merging of technology is creat-
ing a fruitful environment for entirely new entertainment prod-
ucts. New entities, whose existences were previously impossi-
ble- integrated internet entertainment entities like Quokkasports
("Quokka)- may challenge the traditional broadcast-media enti-
ties for video programming dominance."
61 See Few Regulatory Obstacles Seen forA OL Time Warner, COMM. DAILY,
Jan. 11, 2000; Diane Mermigas, A New Time Warner.AOL Perspective,
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 28, 2000, at 20.
62 See Industry Could be in for Changes Once AOL & Time Warner Complete
Merger, ELECTRONIC ADVERTISING & MARKETPLACE REP., Jan. 25, 2000; Di-
ane Mermigas, A Deal that Redefines Content, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Jan. 24,
2000, at 18.
63 See News Corporation Moves to Fight AOL for the Centre, MEDIA
INTELLIGENCE BULL., Mar. 3, 2000.
" See Diane Mermigas, Is Fox the Next Megaplayer?; AOL-Time Warner Deal
Leaves Fox in a Plum Position, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Feb. 7, 2000, at 21.
65 As this article demonstrates inter alia, a primary tactic used by News
Cororation in constructing and furthering its broadcast-media distributional
backbone is the acquisition and control of various sports-related media prod-
ucts throughout the world. See infra Sections 3.1.2.1.-.2.2. Unique Internet
sports entities, like Quokka, present a potential challenge to this sports-related
dominance. Quokka terms its product "sports immersion." Quokka describes
its mission and product as follows:
Quokka is the Digital Sports Entertainment Company. Quokka was
created with a single focus: to bring the real intensity of sports experi-
ences to worldwide audiences. And to use emerging technologies and
emerging media to make it happen. Our thinking goes somethin& like
this: everywhere you look to ay in sports, technology is being utilized
in the service of improved performance. Motion capture, telemetry
and biometrics just to name a few, are employed by athletes and train-
ers who are using technology as a lens-an aperture into what is really
going on. By leveraging these data assets through a wide range of
techni ues and technologies we create data visualizations and simula-
tions that tell this "inner story"- the real story behind a given ath-
letic endeavor- to fans who want to look deeper into what is really
happening. By combining these elements with more conventional
coverage techniques, we create a next-generation sports-entertainment
product.
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The providing of bundled entertainment and telecommunica-
tions services benefits from both economies of scale and scope.
These scale and scope economies reside at an international level.
Mergers that once would draw objections based upon concentra-
tion numbers no longer may be of concern:
Quokka Sports Immersion is a New Form of Sports Entertainment (visited Feb. 7,
2000) < http://company.quokka.com/immersion.html> [hereinafter Quokka
Sports Immersion]. As of this writing, Quokka is a relatively new company and
concept, only having "produced" six immersion products to date: the 1999
Marathon des Sables; a 1999 mountaineering expedition in China; the 1998-99
Around Alone race- an around-the-world "single-handed yacht race"; the offi-
cial site of the International Olympic Committee; the official site for CART
(Championship Auto-Racing Team); and the 1997-98 Whitbread Round the
World Race. See Press: Quokka Sports in the News (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://company.quokka.com/press.html>. Regardless of its youth,
Quokka is a fascinating operation that straddles the media of cyberspace and
traditional sports broadcast-media. It does not take much imagination to envi-
sion a Quokka sports immersion produced sports event-an event exclusively
"broadcast" by Quokka. With the growing convergence of cable, video, tele-
communications, and entertainment media into a streamlined "entertainment-
on-demand" conduit, the emergence of such changes in the way sports events
are "viewed" is closer to reality than one may think. Quokka itself alludes to
such changes in media delivery:
[I]mmersive presentation techniques are not just intensely entertain-
ing- they create whole new business models. Advertisements, spon-
sorship fulfillment, and transactions converge with presentations to
create obvious opportunities to entertain-but they also create oppor-
tunities for profit. Today we produce sporting events on the Internet
and they have proved much more popular than we had expected. The
thing that gets us excited about our jobs (and our future) is the prom-
ise of converged media-the high bandwidth screaming processor fu-
ture- that from all accounts is still a couple of days off. It turns out
that tomorrow is arriving a whole lot faster than we would have an-
ticipated.
Quokka Sports Immersion, supra. The resulting question, relevant to this arti-
cle, is simple: how will traditional broadcast-media entities react to Quokka?
We may already have part of the answer. Quokka lists as investors: Accel
Partners, BancBoston Robertson Stephens, the Ignite Group, Intel Corpora-
tion, MediaOne Interactive Services, Media Technology Ventures, Omega
Venture Partners, Trinity Ventures, and the Wakefield Group. See Quokka
Sports Raises Additional $16 Million in Funding (Press Release, Feb. 20, 1999)
(visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://company.quokka.com/press/index quokka
sports.fhtml>. The notation of MediaOne Interactive Services-an industry
leader at the emerging convergence of electronic media- raises an eyebrow.
One will have to wait to see News Corporation's sports-related response. Yet,
without a doubt, one can expect News Corporation to respond with distribu-
tional savvy.
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As new digital and wireless technologies become available,
alternative modes of content delivery emerge. Such new
modes will increase competition unless obstacles are cre-
ated to their introduction and expansion in the market-
place. The combination of existing facilities' networks in-
creases the likelihood that economies of scale will be
achieved and allow for the offering of enhanced telecom-
munications and information services."
Yet, the consumer benefits of these economies of scale may be
deceiving. As this Article will explain, inefficiencies exist in this
type of a rapidly changing marketplace that depends on network
efficiencies.
3. NEwS CORPORATION
The empire of Rupert Murdoch spans far and wide, setting
foot on every continent except Africa and Antarctica. 7 Self-
styled as "building an unrivaled platform"68 and claiming to be
the only globally vertically integrated media company, News
Corporation has created a web of media-related entities. This
creation has come in part through start-up, yet primarily via ac-
quisition. Begun and based in Australia, News Corporation now
brings in 72% of its operating earnings from the United States,
with the United Kingdom accounting for 23%.69 Australia now
only accounts for 5% of News Corporation's operating earnings.
70
With worldwide revenues totaling $12.8 billion, 7 News Corpora-
tion truly owns an "unrivaled platform" that combines unparal-
Ilene Knable Gotts, The Competitive Analysis of Communications and
Entertainment Mergers, 1060 PLI/CORP 27, 29 (1998).
67 See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
68 See NEWS CORPORATION, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (visited Feb. 7,
2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/report98/business.html > [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT].
69 See NEWS CORPORATION, Chief Executive's Review 1998 ANNUAL
REPORT 15 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/report98/
chiefl.html > [hereinafter Chief Executive's Review].
70 See id.; see also NEWS CORPORATION, Financial Highlights, 1998
ANNUAL REPORT 9 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com
/report98/highl.html> [hereinafter Financial Highlights]. The source reports
the operating revenue in Australian dollars and then translates it into Ameri-
can dollars.
7' See id. at 9.
[Vol. 21:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss1/2
NETWORK ECONOMIC EFFECTS
leled entertainment and news media-market coverage across the
globe.
3.1. News Corporation's Business Structure
Although News Corporation began as a newspaper conglom-
erate,72 newspapers now only account for 25% of its operating in-
come.73 News Corporation divides its business activities and enti-
ties into seven main categories:74  television, s  filmed
entertainment,76 newspapers, magazines and inserts,8 book pub-
lishing, 9 technology," and other." The industry segment lines
72 See generally Chief Executive's Review, supra note 69 (stating that news-
paper publishing is the business in which News Corporation began its opera-
tions).
7' See Financial Highlights, supra note 70, at 10.
74 See NEWS CORPORATION, The News Corporation Limited Worldwide,
1998 ANNUAL REPORT (visited Mar. 9, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/
report98/world.html >.
7' News Corporation's television entities include Fox Broadcasting Com-
pany, Twentieth Centuruy Television, Fox Television Studios, and Fox Tele-
vision Stations. See NEWS CORPORATION, Worldwide Prqperties'(visited Mar.
9, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/cor/index.html>.
"" News Corporation's film entities include Fox Filmed Entertainment:
Twentieth Century Fox, Fox 2000, Fox Searchlight, Fox Animation Studios,
Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox Tele-
vision, Twentieth Century Fox Licensing and Merchandising, Fox Interactive,
and Fox Studios Australia. See NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate and Finan-
cials: Filmed Entertainment (visited Feb. 7, 2000) < http://www.newscorp.com
/public/cor/cor-fe.htm>.
77 See generally NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate: Newspapers (visited Feb.
7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/cor/cor ne.htm> (Australasia
Over 200 national, regional, and local newspapers including major papers such
as The Australian, The Daily Telegraph, Herald Sun, The Courier-Mail,
Northern Territory News, The Mercury, and The Advertiser; United King-
dom: The Times, The Sunday Times, The Sun, and News of the World; and
the United States: New York Post).
71 See generally NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate and Financials: Magazines
and Inserts (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/pubhc/cor/
cor mandi.htm> (Australasia: Pacific Islands Monthly; Canada: News FSI
Canada; United Kingdom: The Times Educational Supplement, The Times
Higher Educational Supplement, The Times Literary Supplement, The Times
Educational Supplement (Scotland), and Nursery World; and the United States:
News America Marketing, TV Guide, and The Weekly Standard).
79 See generally NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate: Book Publishing (visited
Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/cor/cor bp.htm>
(HarperCollins Publishers: Australasia, United Kingdom and Europe, United
States.
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that News Corporation draws are quickly blurring, as News
Corporation often combines formerly separate entities. For in-
stance, during 1998, News Corporation reorganized all of its U.S.
entertainment entities into one conglomerate, Fox Entertainment
Group. Fox Entertainment Group now consists of News Corpo-
ration's "development, production and worldwide distribution of
feature films and television programs, television broadcasting and
cable networks and sports team assets in the United States." 2
News Corporation recently combined its continental European
"media investments" under the guise of a single entity, News
Corporation Europe. 3 The particularly intriguing sports sector
aspects of these product packages will be addressed in Section
3.1.2.1.
3.1.1. Commercial Television / Cable and Satellite Television
News Corporation's commercial television, cable, and satellite
television holdings constitute 35% of its operating income, the
leading industry segment within the company." The focus of
News Corporation is shifting towards television- "the fastest
growing part of the Company."" News Corporation is gaining a
stunning global foothold, as it points out that with its "launch of
satellite platforms in Latin America and Japan, [News Corpora-
" See generally NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate and Financials: Technology
(visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/cor/cor te.htm >
(Australasia: News Interactive and PDN Xiren Information Technology Co.
Ltd.; United Kingdom: News Digital Systems Ltd. and Springboard Internet
Services Ltd.; and the United States: News America Digital Publishing and
Kesmai Corporation).
81 See generally NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate and Financials: Other Op-
erations (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/cor/
cor op.htm> (Australasia: Ansett Australia, Ansett New Zealand, Ansett
Worldwide Aviation Services, Australian International, Broadsystem (Austra-
lia), Festival Records, F.S. Falkiner & Sons, Mushroom Records, National
Rugby League, and Newspoll; Europe: Convoys Group, Broadsystem Ltd.,
PLD Telekom, Radio 538, Sky Radio; and the United States: News America
New Media).
12 NEWS CORPORATION, Television, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (visited Feb.
7, 2000) < http://www.newscorp.com/report98/tvl.htm > [hereinafter Televi.
sion].
83 See NEws CORPORATION, Formation of News Corporation Europe, Nov.
23, 1998 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/news/
news 062.htm>.
84 See Financial Highlights, supra note 70, at 10.
85 Television, supra note 82, at 19.
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tion is] close to attaining global reach approaching 75% of the
world's population."1
6
In the United States, News Corporation is a large player in
the commercial broadcast market with its group of twenty-two
Fox Network stations, 7 which reach upwards of 40% of the U.S.
market.88 Fox Network stations, known collectively as Fox Tele-
vision Stations ("FTS"),89 are strategically situated in top U.S.
television markets. FTS has stations in nine of the top ten U.S.
television markets and fourteen of the top twenty U.S. television
markets.90 In 1998, "twenty of the twenty-two stations were ei-
ther first or second in these locales in common prime time com-
petition."91 News Corporation also owns Fox Broadcasting
Company- consisting of Fox Entertainment, Fox Kids Network,
and Fox Sports.92 FTS stations, in turn, broadcast Fox network
programming.
In the United States, News Corporation is also a rapidly
growing cable television player, with an emphasis on the sports-
related sector. Via a joint venture (now solely owned by News
Corporation), Fox/Liberty Media,"' News Corporation controls
Fox Sports Net (ten regional cable sports channels), Rainbow
Sports (eight regional cable sports channels), Fit TV, Fox Sports
" Chief Executive's Review, supra note 69, at 17 (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
< http://www.newscorp.com/report98/chief3.html >.
17 The stations are: WNYW - New York, NY; KTTV - Los Angeles, CA;
WFLD - Chicago, IL; WTXF - Philadelphia, PA; WFXT - Boston, MA;
WTTG - Washington, DC; KDFW - Dallas, TX; WJBK - Detroit, MI; WAGA
- Atlanta, GA; KRIV - Houston, TX; WJW -Cleveland, OH; WTVT - Tampa,
FL; KSAZ - Phoenix, AZ; KDVR - Denver, CO; KTVI - St. Louis, MO;
WDAF - Kansas City, MO; WITI - Milwaukee, WI; KSTU - Salt Lake City,
UT; WHBQ - Memphis, TN; WGHP -Greensboro, NC; WBRC - Birming-
ham, AL; KTBC - Austin, TX. See NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate and Fi-
nancials: Television (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public
/cor/cor tv.htm>.
88 See Chief Executive's Review, supra note 69, at 15.
89 See Television, supra note 82, at 20 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) < http://www.
newscorp. com/report98/tv2.html>.
90 See id.
91 Id. (citing statistics "based on the May 1998 ratings sweep period with
viewers in the 1849 age group").
92 See id.
" Though originally a joint-venture between John Malone's Liberty Media
and Murdoch's News Cor oration, Fox/Liberty Networks was fully under
News Corporation control-by mid-1999. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Murdoch
Said to be in Deal with Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, at C1.
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World, and FX.94 Overall, "Fox/Liberty Networks owns an in-
terest in, or is affiliated with, twenty-seven regional sports net-
works.""5 News Corporation also owns a 33% share of The Golf
Channel.96 In addition to these sports-related cable entities, News
Corporation owns Fox Family Worldwide (The Family Channel
and MTM Entertainment), Fox News Channel, and FXM: Mov-
ies from Fox.' In a move that uniquely positions News Corpora-
tion at the convergence between television and the Internet, TV
Guide (already owned by News Corporation) merged with
United Video Satellite (which owns Prevue Channel) during
1997.98
Outside of the United States, News Corporation owns a di-
verse palette of cable and satellite television offerings. These
holdings spread across Asia, Australia, Germany,99 India," Indo-
nesia,1" Japan, Latin America, and the United Kingdom.
In Asia, News Corporation owns STAR TV, a satellite televi-
sion service "reaching more than 60 million homes,"102 and which
News Corporation believes to be "Asia's leading satellite broad-
caster."10 3  "STAR produces, either in partnership or alone,
twenty-three channels in eight languages for a multitude of mar-
kets in Asia, reaching fifty-three countries with an estimated audi-
94 See NEWS CORPORATION, Corporate and Financials: Cable and Satellite
Television (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/cor/
corcns.htm> [hereinafter Cable and Satellite Television].
9s See Television, supra note 82, at 20.
96 See Cable and Satellite Television, supra note 94.
97 See id.
98 See Chief Executive's Review, supra note 69, at 16. News Corporation
notes that
[t]he new business merges mediums to deliver programming information
and guidance across print, cable TV, and the Internet. It offers a single-
source solution to advertisers, allowing for more efficient advertising
strategies and broader reach. It will enjoy enhanced revenue opportuni-
ties, for example from cross-selling advertising and custom editions for ca-
ble systems.
Id.
9 49.9% of VOX and a majority interest of TM3. See Cable and Satellite
Television, supra note 94.
1 ISkyB, 50% of Asia Today Ltd., 50% of Program Asia Trading Co. Pvt.
Ltd. and 50% of Siticable Network Pvt. Ltd. See id.
"1 50% of Bahasa Programming Ltd., which owns Film Indonesia. See id.
.02 Television, supra note 82, at 22.
103 ChiefExecutive's Review, supra note 69, at 17.
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ence of 260 million people."1"l In addition, News Corporation
partially owns the following Asian entities: Channel [V] Music
Networks, VIVA Cinema, ESPN STAR Sports (joint venture be-
tween STAR Sports and ESPN), Phoenix Satellite Television
Company Ltd., and Tianjin Golden Mainland Development
Company Ltd."'
In Australia, News Corporation owns 50% of FoxTEL, a joint
venture with Telstra.0 6 FoxTEL is a subscription television serv-
ice with over 300,000 subscribers and is Australia's "largest pay
television provider.""10 Amongst the stations offered by FoxTEL
are Fox Sports, which is 100% owned by News Corporation, and
Sky News Australia, which is 33.3% owned by BSkyB. 0 8 Fox-
TEL has enormous capacity for growth, as it "passes 2.5 million
of [Australia's] total 6.5 million homes."0 9 News Corporation
also owns 50% of Sky Channel."0
In Japan, News Corporation owns 11.375% 1 of Sky Per-
fecTV!, a satellite television service."' Sky PerfecTV! is a new en-
tity, the product of the merger between JSkyB and PerfecTV!; its
largest owners are News Corporation and four Japanese compa-
nies- Sony Corporation, Fuji Television, Softbank Corporation,
and Ito-chu." 3  Sky PerfecTV! has 700,000 subscribers, with its
only competitor having just 100,000 subscribers."' News Corpo-
ration also owns 80% of News Broadcasting Japan, which "pro-
vides seven channels to Sky from Fox, Fox Family, Fox News
and STAR TV, including STAR's music service, Channel [V].""'
In Latin America, News Corporation operates Sky Latin
America, a direct-to-home ("DTH") digital satellite television
service that serves Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia and has more
104 Television, supra note 82, at 22.
105 See Cable and Satellite Television, supra note 94.
106 See id.
107 Television, supra note 82, at 22.
108 See Cable and Satellite Television, supra note 94.
109 Television, supra note 82, at 22.
110 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68.
... See Cable and Satellite Television, supra note 94.
11 See Television, supra note 82, at 22.
113 See id.
114 See id
115 Id.
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than 400,000 subscribers." 6 News Corporation operates Sky
Latin America on a joint-ownership basis with Organizag6es
Globo, Grupo Televisa, and Tele-Communications International,
Inc."' Innova, Sky Latin America's Mexican DTH service, is 30%
owned by News Corporation.' NetSat, Sky Latin America's
Brazilian DTH service, is 36% owned by News Corporation.119
News Corporation also wholly owns the cable channel Canal
Fox, "which now reaches a total of 9.6 million subscribers in
Latin America, making it one of the highest rated general enter-
tainment channels in the region." 20 Fox Family Worldwide
owns Fox Kids Latin America, which has five million subscribers
and "carries programs from other Fox networks but uses area tal-
ent, such as Latin American teenagers, as hosts."121 News Corpo-
ration owns 50% of Fox Sports Americas, which "is the largest
24-hour Spanish sports network in the world" and has "7.2 mil-
lion subscribers in Latin America... and has an additional 1.8
million viewers in the U.S.""2 News Corporation also owns por-
tions of Telecine and Cinecanal.'"'
In the United Kingdom, News Corporation owns 40% of
British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB), "the world's leading satellite
pay television operator."24 BSkyB has over 6.5 million subscrib-
ers and a total of over sixteen million viewers in the United
Kingdom,"2 with approximately 28% of all U.K. homes receiving
BSkyB.2 6 Approximately 15% of all actual television (general
commercial, cable, and satellite) viewing in the United Kingdom
is of BSkyB.IV BSkyB offers over forty channels,'28 half of which
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Cable and Satellite Television, supra note 94.
124 Television, supra note 82, at 21.
123 See id.
126 See British Sky Broadcasting, Sky Online, The Home for the Future is
Wired for Choice (visited on Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.sky.co.uk/homes/
future. htm >.
127 See BskyB Says Cable, Satellite TV Viewing Share Hits 14.98%, supra note
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are either wholly or partially owned by News Corporation. 121
Sports broadcasting is a central feature of BSkyB, with the service
offering three all-sports channels.3s BSkyB recently began the in-
troduction of digital satellite television to the United Kingdom.'
BSkyB also plans on launching an interactive services "network"
soon- British Interactive Broadcasting (BiB)- of which it will
own 32.5%.32
3.1.2. British Sky Broadcasting
There was a time when British Sky Broadcasting was dis-
missed by the U.K.'s TV establishment as an upstart with
poor prospects- Rupert Murdoch's folly. But over the
past decade, BSkyB- now the most successful satcaster in
the world- has transformed television in Britain, consis-
tently setting the agenda for British multichannel TV and,
in the process, forcing old-guard broadcasters to rethink
how they do business. 33
In a relatively short period of time, BSkyB has grown from a
fledgling non-terrestrial broadcast service in a newly deregulated
broadcast market to a market-altering force in the U.K. broadcast
industry.' This section briefly reviews BSkyB's rise to promi-
nence, business strategy, and plans for the future. In 1983, Satel-
lite Television PLC began as the first European commercial satel-
lite service. News Corporation (then known as News
International Corporation) purchased Satellite Television PLC in
1984, renaming it Sky TV. In the following six years, Sky TV
expanded its services, adding channels and offering Sky TV via di-
128 See British Sky Broadcasting, Sky-All the Best Sports, News & Enter-
tainment (visited on Jan. 31, 2000) <http://www.sky.co.uk/home/General
Index.html >.
129 See Television, supra note 82, at 22.
130 See Sky- All the Best Sports, News & Entertainment, supra note 128.
131 See Television, supra note 82, at 22.
132 See id.
133 Erich Boehm, Stratospheric: Leading Satcaster Enters Digital Age,
VARIETY, Feb. 1, 1999, at 35 [hereinafter Boehm, Stratospheric].
134 BSkyB is a leading "regional" example demonstrating how Rupert
Murdoch has built his monopoly on an acquisition-by-acquisition and region-
by-region basis.
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rect-to-home dish systems ("DTH").135 Sky TV also began to ex-
pand its viewer base, selling its product to cable operators who
would then "resell" a repackaged Sky TV product.1 36 By 1990,
Sky TV was in one million U.K. homes.137 In 1990, British Satel-
lite Broadcasting DTH service began transmission. By then, Sky
had leveraged its position as first-mover "to build brand aware-
ness and acceptance." 138 As such, by 1991 Sky TV merged British
Satellite Broadcasting under its wing. 39
Back in 1991, BSkyB was still highly unprofitable and its abil-
ity to survive was questioned. One industry commentator stated
that "[b]uying shares in BSkyB is not so much an investment, as
an act of faith." 4 ' Regardless, BSkyB quickly began to blossom,
first breaking even in March 1992, and by early 1996 was in five
million U.K. homes.
14 1
BSkyB based its success on a strategy that entailed "invest[ing]
in developing its distribution and sales infrastructure."142 In fol-
lowing this strategy, BSkyB spent very little money on develop-
ing its own programming. In turn, it "invested increasingly large
sums in programme [sic] rights."4  This strategy allowed BSkyB
in 1992 to spend £200 million on the exclusive rights to live
broadcast of Premier League Football matches for five years. 44
The agreement was renewed in 1996"'5 with a four-year extension
for £670 million. 14 6 The acquisition of these exclusive rights is of-
ten pointed to as the turning point for BSkyB; "Rupert Mur-
doch's early days of the four-channel Sky Television very nearly
135 See 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at '*8.
136 See id.
117 See British Sky Broadcasting Service, Sky Online, Key Dates in the Devel.
opment of Sky Television (visited Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.sky.co.uk/
skysales/keydates.htm> [hereinafter Key Dates].
138 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at *8.
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 See Key Dates, supra note 137.
142 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at '*8.
143 Id.
144 See British Sky Broadcasting, Sky Online, Examples of Programming In.
vestments in Sky (visited Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.sky.co.uk/skysales
/invest.htm > [hereinafter Examples].
145 See Key Dates, supra note 137.
146 See Examples, supra note 144.
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ended in bankruptcy before being saved in 1991 by the bold ac-
quisition of the Premier League rights." 47
By relying on a proven distribution and sales system that had
comparatively very little fixed cost, BSkyB freed up significant
amounts of cash flow to bid on high-profile events that attracted
subscribers to BSkyB."' As the ICC noted, "Considering that in
1995 42% of [BSkyB's] revenues were spent on programming, it is
easy to see why other broadcasters struggle to compete for pro-
gramme rights to sporting events, films, etc." "9 This business
strategy has paid off in terms of market dominance for BSkyB.
The current market power of BSkyB is quite unparalleled. As the
ICC further noted, the U.K. satellite television has been "domi-
nated by the presence of BSkyB, in terms of ownership, market-
ing, distribution and the provision of the subscriber management
services, without which, no company providing mainstream pro-
gramming services can generate significant revenues.""'0 Some ar-
gue that with the advent of digital cable and the proliferation of
cable-integrated products, BSkyB's dominance of the U.K. broad-
cast-media market may wane.' Regardless, BSkyB is confronting
the digital age with full competitive force, launching its own digi-
tal cable service- SkyDigital' 2 - and its own digital interactive
media-on-demand service- Bib. l 3
3.1.2.1. Sports-Related Strategic Positioning and Purchases
Voted three out of the past five years by the Sporting News as
the most powerful man in sports, Rupert Murdoch is the undis-
14 Richard Russell, Heads I Win, Tails I Win, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept. 11,
1998 (visited on Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages
/tim/98/09111/ timmdamda02006.html?2501972 >.
142 See 1996 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 14, at '*8.
149 Id.
150 Id. at '*9.
151 See, e.g., Boehm, Stratospheric, supra note 133 (discussing the possible
effects of the advent of digital cable and arguing that BskyB's preexisting
dominance in the broadcast market coupled with its control over content
sources will likely minimize the impact of new digital cable companies). See
also supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
151 See Digital Television Introduction, supra note 53; see also Tim Westcott,
SkyDigital Explores Bold Interactive Frontier, VARIETY, Feb. 1, 1999, at 48.
Surprisingly enough, SkyDigital appears -to be expanding overall BskyB capac-
ity: "According to [sic] BskyB, 30% of the 100,000 SkyDigital subscribers who
signed up in its first month of operation ... were new customers." Id.
153 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68; see also Westcott, supra note 152.
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puted king of sports media."5 4 Murdoch gained this position in
very much the same way he gained a similar position in newspa-
pers and every other media entity he has made successful- me-
ticulous construction of a strong distribution, marketing, and
support network. In sports-media this translates to infiltration on
the local level with ownership of regional sports channels, local
team broadcast rights, and a unifying identifiable corporate image
at the upper-most level of distribution.' The powerful combina-
tion of pay-television and sports broadcasting rights are integral
to Murdoch's success.
5 6
15' See Steve Gietshier, The Sporting News, 100 Most Powerful People in
Sports (visited on Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.sportingnews.com/features/
powerful/century listl.htm >. As one commentator noted,
[Rupert Murdoch] lusts after sports after sports programming, which
he said in 1996 would be his "battering ram" into pay TV. It's a lucra-
tive play for Murdoch because his satellite services-including BSkyB,
Sky Latin America and Asia's Star TV- reach about two-thirds of the
world's TV households. Sports is key because it's one of the few
forms of programming that appeals to viewers around the globe.
David Lieberman, $1 Billion Bid Draws Static, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 1998, at
C3.
155 As noted by one industry executive, "on a worldwide basis, he's cer-
tainly the most aggressive and has accomplished the most in terms of both
ownership and reglional distribution of sports television." Michael Knisley,
TSN1s Power 100: All Rupert, All the Time, SPORTING NEws, Dec. 14, 1998, at
16 (quoting Turner Sports president Harvey Schiller).
156 Another executive underscored Murdoch's particularized method, not-
ing that "[Murdoch will] push pay TV as a strategy as fast as governmental
regulations will allow.... He's going to do it in every country he has broad-
casting rights." Lieberman, supra note 154. Michael Knisley detailed the effec-
tiveness of Fox Sports Net, a perfect example of Murdoch's construction of
such a distribution network:
You may not have noticed just how far and wide Fox Sports Net
ranges because the brilliance of the concept is that it concentrates its
coverage on regional levels. You watch Fox Sports New England in
Boston, or Fox Sports Rocky Mountain in Denver, or Fox Sports
South in Atlanta, or Fox Sports Fill-in-the-blank in 19 other major
metropolitan areas. Each bears the same Fox sports logo and each car-
ries the same SportsCenter-like national wrap-up show.., but each
also gives its viewers the regular coverage of their local pro and college
teams (with future plans to bring coverage down to the high school
level) that ESPN doesn't. There are 76 U.S.-based teams, combined,
in the NBA, the NHL and Major League Baseball. Fox Sports Net
owns the local cable rights to 71. That is the genius behind a cable-
sports alternative that in two years has become strong enough to force
ESPN to ditch its plans this autumn for a regional sports network in
southern California.
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Murdoch has turned the sports-media industry upside down
and challenged its logic. As one executive noted, Murdoch "puts
spending on a plateau no one else has ever been on. I mean, there
isn't anybody even close."' 7 News Corporation simply recog-
nizes the power of utilizing sports to achieve success in the
broadcast-media market. Murdoch builds the sports backbone
and feeds other Fox entities off that market infiltration of the Fox
distribution network and brand name. This is no different from
Murdoch's BSkyB, where "[t]he televising of Premier League
[football] matches is the hook that brings in millions of Sky sub-
scribers," 15 8 and is by far the most important asset that BSkyB
possesses." 9 Building a strong, vertically integrated international-
national-regional network system on the backbone of sports-
media, provides News Corporation with the leverage needed to
expand into new media markets. As Murdoch noted, "Sports is
[sic] the universal language of entertainment.""
In this vein, News Corporation also pursues many sports-
related acquisitions, contracts, and transactions. Fox Broadcasting
has a multi-year contract with the NFL.16' As previously men-
tioned, BSkyB has exclusive live broadcast rights to all Premier
Football League football matches in the United Kingdom until
2001.162 Fox Sports owns the rights to live U.S. broadcasts of
Premier League football matches.'63 Fox/Liberty Networks,
through either ownership or affiliation, controls "rights to air
games of 70 professional U.S. sports teams in the National Bas-
ketball Association, National Hockey League and Major League
Baseball (of a total of 75 such teams) and numerous collegiate
sports teams."'" A wholly-owned subsidiary of News Corpora-
Knisley, supra note 155.
157 Knisley, supra note 155 (quoting an anonymous sports executive).
'58 Sky's the Limit for Man U, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998 (visited Feb. 8,
2000) < http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/98/09/09/ timbiz-
patO1OO1.htnl?2501972 >.
159 For an enlightening media industry view on this fascinating keystone
relationship, see Tim Westcott, Soccer Coverage Ups Ante in U.K. B'casting,
VARJETY, Feb. 1-7, 1999, at 44.
16 ChiefExecutive's Review, supra note 69.
161 See id.
162 See Examples, supra note 144.
163 See Colin Gibson, How the Sky Fell in on the Premiership, Sept. 13, 1998
(visited Feb. 8, 2000) < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/>.
164 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68.
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tion owns the Los Angeles Dodgers baseball club, Dodger Sta-
dium, and the land surrounding Dodger Stadium. 6 The land
ownership factor is highly significant, as some think that land
may "end[] up being the site of a new football stadium and home
to an NFL expansion team."166 News Corporation itself formed
and now owns the National Rugby League in Australia (combin-
ing the two major rugby leagues that preceded it- the Super
League and the Australian Rugby League)."' Via Fox/Liberty
Networks, News Corporation owns 40% interests161 in Madison
Square Garden (located in New York City),169 the New York
Knicks basketball team, ° the New York Rangers hockey team,
171
the Staples Center arena (in Los Angeles), 2 and holds an option
to acquire minority interests in the Los Angeles Lakers basketball
team and the Los Angeles Kings hockey team.' It appears that
Murdoch will exercise the option that Fox/Liberty Networks
holds on the Los Angeles Kings, who coincidentally own 10% of
the Los Angeles Lakers. 4 News Corporation is also launching a
chain of Fox Sports Cafes in U.S. airports.
17 1
News Corporation's acquisitions in both the Los Angeles and
New York sports markets have drawn significant attention in the
sporting press. Specifically with respect to Los Angeles, combine
all of Murdoch's ownership interests together, and, as Knisley put
it, "He's putting a half nelson on pro-sports in L.A." 6 In New
York City, as noted above, Fox Entertainment owns minority in-
terests in Madison Square Garden, the New York Knicks, and the
New York Rangers."r The parent company to the company
through which News Corporation owns these minority interests
165 See Knisley, supra note 155.
166 Id.
167 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68.
168 See Reports: Murdoch to Buy out Partner in Sports Network, Associated
Press, Apr. 2, 1999.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68.
174 See Knisley, supra note 155.
175 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68.
176 Knisley, supra note 155 (noting Murdoch's extensive holdings in Los
Angeles).
177 See id.
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may purchase the New York Yankees." 8 As Knisley put it again,
it "sounds to me like another half nelson on the country's other
major urban professional sports center. You don't have to be
much of a mathematician to add those two halves and get one real
stranglehold."" 9
Through these vertically integrative acquisitions, transactions,
and contracts, News Corporation purchases the broadcast prod-
uct itself and thus builds its 'sports' brand name.18 News Corpo-
ration utilizes the operating efficiencies and competitive market
strength that this large vertically integrated "network" achieves."
Simply stated, Murdoch's empire is deliberate and extensive about
building a sprawling distribution and support network. Sports
broadcasting is very much the key to unlocking the door to the
efficiencies of scale that the network brings.
3.1.2.2. The News Corporation-s Future Business Strategy
On a broader level, News Corporation's business strategy is
no different than it is at the more micro-level of sports broadcast-
ing and ownership. News Corporation's macro-level of business
strategy is merely an extension of the method of network build-
ing model that Fox Sports and BSkyB employ. In fact, the suc-
cesses of both Fox Sports and BSkyB are fundamental to the im-
plementation of this overall plan. Specifically, Fox
Entertainment Group and News Corporation Europe are the re-
spective broader companion umbrellas that these two entities are
likely to support.
In 1998, News Corporation created Fox Entertainment
Group and News Corporation Europe. Fox Entertainment
178 See id.
171 Id. Knisley continues, pointedly begging the question about one of the
blatant antitrust issues among many, "[s]o who does [Murdoch] root for in a
Dodgers-Yankees World Series?" Id.
110 See Chief Executive's Review, supra note 69.
181 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68. News Corporation's own lan-
guage draws out these vertically integrative efficiencies.
Other advantages have come to FTS with the unique integration of the
FOX network: the larger the station group, the more efficient and effec-
tive the network. This is particularly noteworthy with FOX's investment
in sports programming, where FTS has stations in 11 of 15 NFL markets,
in 19 of 26 Major League Baseball ("MLB") markets and in 15 of 20 Na-
tional Hockey League ("NHL") markets.
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Group essentially brings under one umbrella all of News Corpo-
ration's multi-media and sports activities in the United States.182
Under its foundational mandate, News Corporation Europe "in-
vestigate[s] and manage[s] media investments in Continental
Europe.""8 3 News Corporation Europe, although not directly af-
filiated with BSkyB, is obviously designed to mirror BSkyB's
creation of a distribution system foothold, with potential satellite
systems slated for both Italy and France. As Murdoch noted,
"[f]ollowing the outstanding success of BSkyB in the U.K., we see
opportunities to participate in media developments across
Europe.""8 4 Although not directly affiliated with BSkyB, the
Chairman of News Corporation Europe sits on the board of
News Corporation and of BSkyB itself.*"' This arrangement is no
coincidence, underscored by Erich Boehm's comment that
"[t]here is ... the real possibility that BSkyB may venture onto
the Continent." 86
Both of these umbrella organizations put News Corporation
in a better position to exploit economies of scale and build "net-
works" on the backbones of Fox Sports and BSkyB. In addition,
sheer buying power helps News Corporation to purchase entities
that further tap into these economies of scale. The Fox Enter-
prises Group IPO raised $2.8 billion."8 When asked what News
Corporation would do with this influx of funds, News Corpora-
tion and Fox Television stated that it would "see what opportuni-
ties come our way as life goes forward."'
182 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68. As News Corporation described
its formation of Fox Entertainment Group:
[It says something about our News Corporation philosophy. We are
responding, as we always do, to the market. Analysts aninvestors
have told us, as I mentioned above, that they find News Corporation
daunting to follow. And, despite the fact that we generate the bulk of
our earnings in the U.S., many traditional American investors do n t
own our stock because they view News Corporation as a non-U.S.
stock and therefore not a required holding. The Fox Entertainment
Group will be a U.S. company. It will hold our U.S. television, film,
and sports assets and it wil Ihelp unlock the value of our holdings.
ChiefExecutive's Report, supra note 69.
183 Formation of News Corporation Europe, supra note 83.
184 Id.
185 See id.
186 Boehm, Stratospheric, supra note 133, at 36.
1"7 See Knisley, supra note 155.
188 Id.
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News Corporation exploits economies of scale that give it the
power to broadcast major events and to profit from offering a
wider array of specialized entertainment options to an ever-
fragmenting media audience.189 News Corporation caters to and
further saturates this fragmented audience by developing efficient
delivery structures, purchasing desired product entities, and estab-
lishing strategic partnerships with developing media outlets."
News Corporation has much power in determining what the
television viewers of the world watch- whatever content, in
whatever form, in whatever package.
4. TiH INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PROBLEM PRESENTED
BY NEWS CORPORATION
The antitrust problem presented by News Corporation is
rooted in a hard-to-define, rapidly evolving market- a market
that blurs the lines between distribution, content, and delivery.
The development of this market leads to: 1) business relation-
ships that create international markets by combining formerly
domestic products; 2) regulatory hesitancy, as regulators would
189 See Chief Executive's Report, supra note 69.
190 Commenting on the fragmentation of the broadcast-media audience,
Murdoch notes that:
Thanks to improved delivery, the number of television channels avail-
able to the consumer is proliferating. And thanks to advances in
computers, the consumer is now able to access, and even interact with,
news, entertainment, and information in a wholly new medium, the
Internet. It all adds up to an explosion of choice.
At the same time, the mass audience is there for big events such as the
Super Bowl, the OJ. Simpson trial and the World Cup. These occa-
sions are all the more startling because of the increased reach (and de-
mand) provided by developing technology.
We benefited from one of these big events this year- the Titanic phe-
nomenon. We are systematically creating others-hence our interest
in televising major events.
We also know that a key part of the answer to both fragmentation
and big events is branding. Faced with the chaos of choice on the one
hand, and the need to plug quickly into whatever's happening on the
other, consumers will increasingly turn to familiar names to guide
them. News Corporation possesses an unrivaled array of these famil-
iar names. We are working to position them even better-for which-
ever way our audience chooses.
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like the market to mature before they deem if regulation is neces-
sary; and 3) regulatory market definition problems, as regula-
tors- due to nation-based bias- incorrectly examine only the na-
tionally relevant antitrust issues.
The answer to the regulatory problem is too often either no
regulation or a limited regulation of News Corporation's transac-
tions and conduct. Standing idly by, regulators ignore the urgent
antitrust problem presented by News Corporation's conduct-
and the broader, more general international antitrust concerns
that News Corporation's activities trigger. The broadcast-media
market is changing, not necessarily in the early stages of growth.
In changing markets, market power tends to remain in the hands
of the already empowered. This condition sits contrast to
emerging markets, which tend to have more fluctuation in who
the powerful market players are as the product itself rapidly
evolves. Corporations enjoying current market power work to
leverage that power to gain controlling influence in the changing
marketplace. In terms of conduct and influence, one factor
remains constant in broadcast-media: News Corporation. As
News Corporation lithely shifts from distribution to content
dominance, it demonstrates how quickly monopoly power can
accrue and adapt before regulators are able to identify an antitrust
concern. The fact that News Corporation's monopolistic
activities only occur at an international level exacerbates the issue.
Even if regulators were to act more swiftly, they would be ill-
equipped to frame News Corporation's conduct in an analytic
structure capable of addressing the international nature of News
Corporation's motives. If the regulatory community does not
take affirmative steps to monitor and moderate News
Corporation's activity, market structural internalization, and
reinforcement of monopolistic behavior will ensue. An
international approach is required for regulating companies like
News Corporation. The remainder of this Article examines why
an international approach is needed and proposes an international
solution.
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4.1. The Totality of the News Corporation International
Antitrust Quandary
News Corporation does not think in terms of national
boundaries or geographic location.191 News Corporation instead
conceives of its business in terms of horizontal reach.'92 News
Corporation's global control of the sports media market is a
prime example of how it operates in this manner. This control
also demonstrates the broader market power that News Corpora-
tion aims to achieve in the broadcast-media market. As illus-
trated, the expanding "sports-media" sector is a leading "market"
example, demonstrating how the globalization and redefinition of
191 For a background on European Union antitrust regulation of media
markets, see John Temple Lang, Media, Multimedia, and European Community
Antitrust Law, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1296 (1998).
192 As noted infra note 195, the News Corporation arguably participates in
a rapidly evolving high-technology market. Often times, such rapid evolution
of technology occurs concomitant with the rapid construction ofa network-
a network in terms of the "network effect" alluded to throughout this article.
Considering the plethora of benefits that networked, high-tech monopolies
such as News Corporation create for the consumer, judging how best to go
about the antitrust analysis in such contexts is understandably quite difficult.
As one author notes, "the application of antitrust enforcement principles to
dynamic network industries is intellectually demanding." Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries, ANTITRUST BULL., Sept.
22, 1998, at 859, 882. Rubinfeld underscores the root of the intellectually de-
manding task, the interplay between technological advancement and benefit
via the 'monopolistic' network itself, the im ortance of allowing technological
innovation, and the importance of keeping the market competitive. As Rubin-
feld notes,
In dynamic, high-technology industries, the antitrust enforcement
stakes are raised. On one hand, because the path of innovation today
will significantly affect future product quality and price, the potential
benefits of enforcement are huge. On the other hand, because the
path of innovation is highly uncertain and technology is rapidly
changing, the potential costs of enforcement errors are also large.
Id. at 860. Rubinfeld's solution to this quandary:
I believe it vital that while being appropriately cautious about criticiz-
ing aggressive procompetitive behavior, the antitrust authorities make
every effort to insure that dominant incumbent firms with monopoly
power (firms with the ability to raise prices above and/or reduce qual-
ity below competitive levels and/or to exclude competitors) not use
their substantial market power to harm innovation, to retard techno-
logical progress, and ultimately to harm consumers.
Id. The solution seems warranted with respect to broadcast-media, particularly
due to the political and economic power held by broadcast-media.
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product and geographic markets is propelling News Corporation
forward.
Sports media mergers in general- like most cross-media
mergers- are, for the most part, pro-competitive, offering effi-
ciencies for the consumer and creating better, more differentiated
products and choices. With the advent of these mergers, sports-
media offerings grow exponentially, particularly across interna-
tional boundaries. As Rupert Murdoch gains greater control and
leverage in televising Premier League Soccer games, consumers in
the United States can now purchase a channel that carries the
same slate of the Premier League games that is available to U.K.
consumers who purchase Murdoch's BSkyB.193 In the United
States, Murdoch has followed a parallel path of acquisition, using
Fox as the vehicle to acquire the Los Angeles Dodgers, a minority
interest in both the New York Knicks and New York Rangers,
and an option to purchase a minority interest in both the Los
Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Kings.
Consumers obviously both profit from the "network effect"
created by News Corporation's vertically integrated, extensive
media distribution, marketing, and support system.194 News
Corporation is an innovator in the delivery of the broadcast-
media product. 9 With increased vertical control comes the dan-
" Individuals in the United States can purchase a pay-per-view English
Premier League game package through the Fox Sports entity Fox Sports
World. Fox Sports, Fox Sports World, Premier League Live (Visited Feb. 8,
2000) <http:7/www.foxsports.com/js index.frm?content =/foxsportsworld/
index.sml >.
"" The "network effect" is "the increasing return in value to the owners
and participants in a network as the number of members or components in it
increases." Arquit, supra note 2, at 162.
195 The News Corporation arguably offers a high technology product in an
'innovation market.' The rate of innovation in the delivery of broadcast-media
is extremely rapid, particularly considering the growing convergence between
cable, digital, internet, and telecommunications mediums. While News Cor-
poration is a leader in the delivery of broadcast-media content via such medi-
ums, its distribution network does not directly control the evolution of such
mechanisms. Whether this nuanced distinction has any antitrust implication is
a point for debate. Arguably, as these delivery mechanisms become more inte-
grated and technologically advanced, News Corporation's ability to maintain
its market position will wane, as more adept competitors utilize the emerging
electronic medium. Even if one believes that News Corporation does assert
some modicum of control over innovation in these emerging technologies, the
antitrust theory of innovation markets may apply. Innovation/high-tech mar-
kets:
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[Are] characterized by many functional service relationships between
companies as buyers and suppliers of infrastructure. These relation-
ships, which often involve a high degree of de pendence, give rise to le-
gal questions of access, exclusivity, and foreclosure, as well as access
charge policies and interconnection issues that are usually thought of
as reglatory rather than antitrust issues. They also give rise to the
possibility of day-to-day minor discrimination and resulting contro-
versies ....
High-tech markets are characterized by complex relationships, due in
part to the number of different kinds of companies that may be in-
volved in any given situation. For example, in cable TV there are the
companies that own the transmitters and satellites, program produc-
ers, advertisers, and cable-owning companies, as well as viewers and
competitors of any or all of these companies. There are also compa-
nies such as sports organizations, stadium owners, and Olympic
committees that own the right to broadcast sport events, and film stu-
dios with portfolios of films.
It is sometimes said that in these markets innovation may be more
important than prices, in particular where the market itself is emerg-
ing and wholly new products or services are coming into existence. It
is, however, important to be clear. In these markets, price is often less
important than the technical or other advantages of the product.
These advantages are usually due to an innovation, which is likely to
be a recent innovation because all or almost all the features of these
products are changing. But, it is not innovation as such that consti-
tutes the advantage, and one cannot assume that any innovation is al-
ways and automatically an improvement or is better than a competi-
tor's product that has not changed in the same respect.
John Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets
and High Technology Industries, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717, 720-21 (1997) (de-
scribing thirteen "features" of high technology markets and in turn discussing
the EU's approach to antitrust regulation of such markets). Under the theory
of innovation markets, antitrust regulation in high-technology sectors is
viewed as an inefficient encumbrance upon the rate of innovation. Many argue
that in such markets, antitrust intervention forestalls product development and
discourages risk-taking- the very engine of technological development. See id.
at 767.
Lang's factors unwittingly describe the functioning of the market in which
News Corporation operates. International antitrust regulation of News Cor-
poration should certainly take into account the innovative nature of the broad-
cast-media market. A more in-depth analysis of these innovation market im-
plications, while intriguing, is beyond the direct scope of this Article.
Regardless, such analysis may be a mere exercise in futility, obscuring the true
problem that News Corporation creates. Like Microsoft, while News Corpo-
ration innovates, it also controls the market. See supra note 4 and infra note
202 and accompanying text. Innovation becomes a hollow defense of monop-
oly. As the analysis in this Article suggests, the concept of News Corporation
driving an "innovation market-just like News Corporation (and Microsoft
for that matter) producing a "network effect"- may merely constitute the be-
nign surface on a more malignant reality of distribution control.
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gers that traditionally goes hand-in-hand with such excessive con-
trol of a distribution chain. While consumer choices and net-
work efficiencies may grow exponentially, the vertical integrator
obviously chooses which efficiencies to exploit. As a company
vertically integrates its distributed product, it gains control over
how the product is priced, packaged, and distributed. Traditional
market forces lose control as the vertical integration itself creates
a unique product- a market unto itself. The "network" then be-
comes the product, with one entity controlling the product net-
work. Entry becomes nearly impossible as the vertical integrator
cuts off all entry points.196 The consumer is at the mercy of the
product network owner.
The role of innovation market theory analysis has a place in the overall
News Corporation antitrust calculus. The concepts of high-technology and
innovation theory concomitantly trigger ancillary issues that dwell in the
growing conflict between intellectual property and antitrust regulation. In
simple terms, the conflict arises when intellectual property rights become ei-
ther a weapon in unfair competition with rival firms or a shield from antitrust
regulation itself. For an interesting look at the little analyzed confluence of
intellectual property rights and the regulation of mergers and acquisitions, see
McManis, supra note 1. McMannis's analysis is somewhat tangent to antitrust
analysis itself; yet, his conclusion that more focus must be placed upon the in-
ternational effects of intellectual property recognition, particularly via the
WTO and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs"), has specific applicability here further reinforcing the impor-
tance of an international antitrust vision. See id. at 1308.
196 The expansion of News Corporation may very well make entry pro-
hibitively difficult in the worldwide broadcast-media distribution market. In
the future, many content providers may have no choice but to contract with
News Corporation to bring their product to the international (or even domes-
tic) market. Due to the transparent (non-content) nature of News Corpora-
tion's monopoly (i.e., its distribution network) this scenario could imply that,
at least in the context of pay-TV broadcast-media, News Corporation has be-
come an "essential facility." The application of the "essential facilities doc-
trine" to News Corporation, while certainly intriguing and a topic that would
likely generate heated debate, is beyond the scope of this Article. For an in-
triguing look at how Microsoft Corporation might be affected by the Euro-
pean Union's application of this doctrine, see Mercer H. Harz, Dominance
and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through Microsoft Windows at the Es.
sential Facilities Doctrine, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 189 (1997). Harz argues
that under the liberal construction of the European Union essential facilities
doctrine, "regardless of Microsoft's treatment by U.S. authorities .... Micro-
soft may have violated a duty of nondiscrimination imposed under European
Union law by reason of its marketplace dominance and control of an essential
facility." Id. at 190-91. For an antitrust comparison of Microsoft and New
Corporation, see infra note 202.
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Specifically with respect to sports broadcast-media, in at-
tempting to acquire Manchester United,97 and acquiring the Los
197 The BSkyB- Manchester United transaction was a major attempt to
solidify News Corporation's backbone in the United Kingdom, Europe, and
around the world. The transaction was rejected by the Competition Commis-
sion in early April of 1999. Regardless, the attempted transaction is still an ex-
ample of the complexity of antitrust analysis in the face of a News Corpora-
tion transaction. With a variety of relevant product markets and geographic
markets at issue, U.K. antitrust regulators very well may not have focused on
the more international anti-competitive effects and international public policy
concerns that the potential merger created. While the Competition Commis-
sion's decision was to reject the merger, it is apparent that, at least in that case,
the nation-based concerns resulted in the same result that would have followed
in an international context of antitrust scrutiny. A similar result is not likely
in every News Corporation transaction that raises international antitrust con-
cern. With the myriad of factors at play in nation-based analysis, the interna-
tional factors seem to fade into the background, even though "international"
antitrust concerns have direct national implications on a tertiary level.
The reality was that many different product markets were relevant depend-
ing on through what product filter one looked at the BSkyB- Manchester
United transaction. There were two, broad ranging, universal markets that
were potentially effected by the merger: the broadcast-media market and the
actual football club market. On a more detailed level, these two broad markets
break down into other variations. Some of these markets included: the overall
broadcast market, the overall sports-media broadcast market, the market for
broadcast of Premier League football games and Manchester United football
games, the market of football teams and Premier League football teams, the
market for a certain caliber of team, the market for teams to gain broadcast
slots, and the advertising market. The further difficulty in determining the
relevant product market is that in sports broadcast-media, geographic market
definition is difficult to separate from the product itself. The broadcast prod-
uct changes as the geographic market changes. Such is the true beauty of Mur-
doch's overall strategy. As he acquires various sorts properties and media en-
tities across nationarboarders he combines pro ducts, offers them in different
packages, forms, and in turn changes the products as he expands the geography
of where these products are offered.
With respect to the BSkyB- Manchester United transaction, the U.K.
football club market was unfortunately too readily apparent. Looking at the
market concentrations at this level lead one to believe that the BSkyB-Man-
chester United merger presented very little concern. As the press noted,
"Given that Sky is buying but a single club, it is hard to see where there is a
real competition issue." City Editor, Sky's the Limit for Man U, SUNDAY
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998 (visited Jan. 13, 2000) <http://www.sunday-
times.co.uk/news/pages/ tim/98/09/09/timbizpat0lOOl.htm?2501972>. The
real market concerns over power concentration are, however, in the realm of
broadcast-media- the broader market (worldwide and U.K.) all the way down
to the football broadcast market. In the end, U.K. competition regulators rec-
ognized this, yet, only with respect to the U.K. market.
The true product market conceptualization difficulty in the BSkyB-Man-
chester United antitrust analysis emanated from the convergence of both
broader markets- the football and broadcast markets- and the dynamic and
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Angeles Dodgers198 (and similar entities), Murdoch's business
strategy is simple- create a "product network" of complete con-
trol. By controlling both ends of the product--the assembly (the
confusing definition of those product markets in the context of varying geo-
graphic markets. The resulting antitrust concern lay in what anti-competitive
conduct could ensue from such a merger-something that plainly results from
the simple combination of the world's most extensive sports-media network
(that is filly entrenched in the United Kingdom) and the world's most popular
football club. Traditional antitrust analysis, which is not circumscribed to deal
with such confluence and adaptation of market structures, could never really
grasp the fullness of the anti-competitive effect without realizing the three-
imensional nature of the true product market at issue in the
BskyB/Manchester United merger.
Most importantly, in the United Kingdom, control over football broadcast
rights in many ways determines the success (subscriber level) of a particular
broadcast service. By purchasing Manchester United, BSkyB potentiilly could
have exploited this inefficiency in the broadcast market by leveraging one
quasi-monopoly (Manchester United) too artificially, i.e. not competing on a
basis of price, service, innovation, etc.; propping-up the underlying business or
other products; and creating or artificially rein orcing another monopoly, the
broadcast service. This is known as monopoly leveraging. See infra note 202
(citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948)). In such a climate,
BSkyB most likely would have been able to charge a higher overall price than
would have been the case if it did not control Manchester United's broadcast
destiny as such matters would instead be determined by"market-factors." In a"market" scenario BSkyB has to compete with other media outlets for broad-
cast rights- sitting on only one side of the bargaining table. On the surface,
allowing BSkyB to control Manchester United might have appeared to pro-
mote pure competition among rival clubs-essentially rival businesses. To
BSkyB and News Corporation, however, control of Manchester United meant
power, media power that had very little to do with just the United Kingdom
and everything to do with a "world TV picture," and at best, had very little to
do with "the beautiful game."
... Murdoch has already begun to use News Corporation's monetary girth
in supporting the Los Angeles Dodgers. For example, the Dodgers spent $105
million over seven years to obtain all-star Pitcher Kevin Brown. The contract,
at the time, was a baseball record. See Ronald Blum, Brown Signs for $105 Mil.
lion Dodgers Snare Padres Pitcher with Baseball's Richest Contract, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 1998, at D16, available in 1998 WL 14519604. Upon the
announcement of the deal it was noted in the press that Brown's $100 million
plus deal may have signaled the beginning of the end for small-market teams.
See id.
The Cincinnati Reds, a small-market team, recently successfully traded for
and signed future hall-of-famer Ken Griffey Jr. See Jim Cour, Griffey Era Ends
in Seattle, (last modified Feb. 10, 2000) <http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/
2000/0210/380700.html>. This deal is commonly seen as the exception to
small market teams being able to attract and afford big-name talent. Mr. Grif-
fey requested the trade for family and personal reasons, also accepting what
was widely believed to be below-market pay. See Peter Gammons, Cincinnati
Going Gofyfor Griffey, (last modified February 12, 2000) <http://espn.go.
comr gammon/s/update/0212.html>.
[Vol. 21:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss1/2
NETWORK ECONOMIC EFFECTS
trol. By controlling both ends of the product- the assembly (the
team itself) and the packaging (the broadcast network)- he de-
termines all allocation factors.'99 In more general terms, Murdoch
has constructed a delicate web of control in which he owns
and/or controls terrestrial television and satellite-television out-
lets, major newspapers, and leading major league sports franchises
and stadia. As Murdoch gains more control over the general
broadcast-media product, he solidifies his ability to bury his rivals
throughout the world.
News Corporation's extensive worldwide distribution, mar-
keting, and support system is unparalleled. News Corporation,
via various entities that it either owns or controls, adds small
pieces to this network every year. These pieces, when considered
part of the greater whole that is News Corporation, come to-
gether to form a powerful structure that can deliver services and
products that no other media organization can deliver. In es-
sence, Murdoch has created a product market ecapsulated by his
own distribution network. Despite the wide range of new
choices that News Corporation as a whole can offer consumers,
there is a highly dangerous element that underlies each of these
199 Such control by media entities, just on competitive terms within a
sports league itself, produces an anti-competitive situation. As Arsene Wenger,
manager of the Arsenal Football Club, a competing club in the Premier
League, noted about the then pending BskyB/Manchester United merger and
future media-football club mergers, "The big danger is when three or four
[clubs] can break away from the others and the rest cannot keep up .... They
can pay players three or four times the salary. The rules of the game could
change iffour or five clubs have owners from the media." Matt Dickinson,
Carlton Sets its Sights on Arsenal, TIMEs (London), Sept. 11, 1998, available in
1998 WL4862198. With News Corporation's current holdings of American
sports teams and networks, concern that such a scenario may occur on the
other side of the Atlantic, regardless of the sport, is not unwarranted. The
concern should not be just for the competitive health of a league, but also for
the broader "distribution network control" implications. To News Corpon-
tion, sports teams and networks are just tools of international construction and
reinforcement. This is precisely the point that nation-based antitrust law
misses. For a closer look at the application of antitrust law to sports leagues in
the context of growing corporate ownership, see Thomas Kennedy, Comment,
Will America's Pastime Be a Part Of America's Future?: An Antitrust Analysis
That Enables Sports Leagues to Compete Effectively in the Entertainment Market,
46 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1998).
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choices. All of these choices are produced, packaged, and distrib-
uted by News Corporation."
The true antitrust question is whether one entity should have
so much market power in broadcast-media.0 1 While Murdoch is
able to use his expansive network and media-power to create
products and variety for the consumer that previously did not ex-
ist, there are negative externalities that arise in this network that
are too detrimental to ignore. For example, one entity ends up
holding vast economic power in the television content market.
This leads to the constructive question: how does antitrust regu-
lation account for this? 2
200 In an abstract sense, News Corporation's distribution network is the
type of vertically integrated network that usually raises interoperability con-
cerns. As one author described interoperability:
An antitrust concern over standards for interoperability, or interface
standards, may arise where third parties seek access to the network,
where communication among elements of the network is governed by
particular standards, and where a party (or an exclusive group) has in-
tellectual property rights that ostensibly control access to the network
through control over a dominant technology and/or standards.
Arquit, supra note 2, at 162.
201 Such non-economic concerns over concentration frequently enter the
antitrust calculus. This paper specifically addresses this historical trend. See
supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
202 The entirety of the News Corporation antitrust problem closely re-
sembles the anti-competitive network effects paradox/problem posed by the
Microsoft Corporation. News Corporation and Microsoft both have con-
structed distribution networks that embody a true monopoly. Microsoft's
Windows operating system is quite similar to News Corporation's media net-
work. Without those "networks," consumers could not access multitudes of
front-end products. Both Microsoft and News Corporation own and control
exclusive conduits/or products. Via such conduits, both entities can engage in
monopoly leveraging- using the conduit monopoly to gain an unfair advan-
tage in secondary product markets (content, i.e., computer software [Micro-
soft] or programming [News Corporation]). See generally United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) (detailing the concept of monopoly leverag-
ing). The policy questions are very much the same. Despite the benefits to the
consumer and the reality that no other entity could bring such products to the
market, the dilemma is clear- are consumers really better off having to access
News Corporation and Microsoft Corporation for so many products? While
this comparison is certainly revealing, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
For background on the antitrust issues raised by the conduct of Microsoft,
see generally Michael P. Kenny & William H. Jordan, United States v. Micro-
soft: Into the Antitrust Regulatory Vacuum Missteps the Department ofJustice, 47
EMORY L.J. 1351, 1356-58 (1998) (arguing that the Department of Justice
usurped its statutory authority in issuing the consent decree in the first Micro-
soft case, and noting, "The dispute resolution process the Division initially de-
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Oftentimes, the international effects of News Corporation
transactions escape the eyes of national antitrust regulators. 3
cided to use to challenge Microsoft's distribution of Internet Explorer...
could not have been more ill-conceived for resolving this complex issue...
[and] the common-law tradition of antitrust is better served when novel cases
presenting controversial issues are resolved in the due course of open litigation
on the merits, and not through the back door of truncated contempt proceed-
ings"); Charles F. Rule, Overview of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and its Appli-
cation to Microsoft, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1998, at 253 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Litera Property Course Handbook
Series No. 64-4037, 1998) (delineating the basic legal arguments behind the anti-
trust issues surrounding Microsoft); Abraham Perlstein, Microsoft and its Anti-
trust Violations, 11 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 85 (1996) (detailing an analysis of the
potential antitrust violations of Microsoft in the context of the IBM and
AT&T antitrust cases and the connection of the computer industry to the
health of the economy); Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, The Justice
Department, and Antitrust Theory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 621(1996) (using the Mi-
crosoft case as catalyst for a policy analysis of the Justice Department's current
theoretical underpinnings that motivate its approach to antitrust regulation);
Willard K. Tom et al., Competitive Impact Statement in United States v. Micro-
soft Corporation, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LITIGATION 1995, at 404, 449
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Handbook Series
No. 64-4037, 1998) (setting forth the statutorily required Competitive Impact
Statement which delineates the government's arguments in the first Microsoft
case); Victoria E. Brieant, The Microsoft Consent Decree: A Case Study (and a
Suggestion that Antitrust Enforcement Become Less Political), C137 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 55 (1995) (commenting on the political underside of
the Microsoft consent decree- that of avoiding potentially long litigation that
would span future administrations which might not share the same view of
MicrosoK's actions- and arguing for institutional change that might create a
less politicized atmosphere and more consistency in antitrust regulation); Rob-
ert P. Taylor, Pilkington, Microsoft, and S.C. Johnson Signal a Policy Shift at the
DOJ, 9 ANTITRUST 23, 23 (Fall 1994) (arguing that via the Draft Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property and the
Pilkington, Microsoft, and S.C. Johnson cases, a picture emerges of what the
Department's rekindled interest in intellectual property may portend. The
preview, however, is not at all clear. Although there is no basis for predicting a
return to the rigid per se approach used by the Department to analyze these
transactions during the 1970s, it is apparent that this Justice Department is
likely to be substantially more interventionist than its predecessors).
203 The U.K. regulatory stance on the BSkyB purchase of Manchester
United serves as a good example of the phenomenon. Upon referral to the
Mergers and Monopolies Commission ("MMC"), the MMC itself posted a let-
ter detailing the specific competition questions it was investigating in its de-
termination on the merger. See Mergers and Monopolies Commission,
BskyB/Manchester United Merger Inquiry, BSKYB/MANCHESTER UNITED:
ISSUES LETTER (visited Feb. 7, 2000) < http://www.mmc.gov.uk
/bskyiss.htm>. In its market inquiry, the MMC focus was somewhat open-
ended, leaving room for some international concentration concerns. However,
noticeably absent is any inquiry about any interconnection between BSkyB
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When News Corporation purchases media outlets in a jurisdic-
tion in which it previously did not operate, traditional antitrust
red flags never rise. Even when News Corporation purchases en-
tities in a jurisdiction in which it previously operated, regulators
are slow to show concern. The U.K. regulatory investigation
into BSkyB's purchase of Manchester United was the exception."
Despite the rejection of the merger by the U.K. Competition
Commission,"' is clear that its analysis was not based upon inter-
national antitrust concerns." 6
and any other News Corporation entity. See id. The letter focuses primarily
upon a long list of public interest questions. Interestingly enough, the focus
within this section is without exception upon the footbal and U.K. broadcast
market effects of the transaction. The only mention of News Corporation,
while straightforward enough, is quite revealing. It asks "[w]hether News In-
ternational has the ability materially to influence BSkyB and whether this
raises public interest issues additional to those identified in this letter." Id. If
U.K. competition regulators are only at this point in their understanding of
News Corporation, one must pause to wonder if they truly appreciate the
macro motivations behind the transaction itself. By allmeans, this is not to
fault the regulators themselves. Rather such misunderstandings demonstrate
the inadequacy of nation-based antitrust law to compensate for multinational
corporation conglomerate international business strategy. In this instance, it is
clear that U.K. antitrust law itself dictates the angle at which U.K. competition
regulators view the BSkyB/Manchester United transaction. From such an an-
gle, viewing the transaction from the outset as merely a News Corporation
transaction is difficult, if not technically impossible, due to the particular cor-
porate ownership structures of News Corporation and BSkyB.
204 See Chris Ayres, Mandelson Refers BSkyB's Man United Bid to MMC,
SUNDAY TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.sunday-
times.co.uk/news/pages/ tim/98/10/30/timbizbiz02028.html?2501972 >.
205 See Summary of British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC Manchester United
PLC: A Report on the Proposed Merger (visited Mar. 24, 2000) < http://www.
mmc.gov.uk/cm4305.htm>.
206 See id. The analysis, while taking a broad look at the impact of the
merger on the broadcast market itself, tended to focus on sports broadcasting
specifically. In addition, nowhere in the analysis was a mention of interna-
tional effect. See id. The following excerpt from a commentary on the
BSkyB/Manchester United deal elucidates the antitrust dynamic of concern-
the paradox of conflicting national and international concerns-giving flavor
and color to the control and morphing of product markets by News Corpora-
tion:
At the same time another report, this time in last Sunday's Observer,
should also set alarm bells ringing throughout the Premier League [the
top-flight U.K. football league in which Manchester United com-
petes]. 'Rupert's Fox is off and running' was the headline on a story
that revealed Premiership matches are being shown on a pay-per-view
basis in the United States through Fox Sports Network. Fox bought
rights to the Premiership from IMG/Canal Plus, who paid £100m for
[Vol. 21:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss1/2
NETWORK ECONOMIC EFFECTS
While it is true that some jurisdictions- particularly the
United States2 7- provide for some measure of antitrust extrater-
ritoriality, those provisions are usually centered on anti-
competitive effects that are felt in the regulating national jurisdic-
tion."' Virtually no national antitrust provisions capture the
the overseas sales, to screen the Premiership matches live in the
United States. "Fox are pushing very hard with soccer in America,"
crowed Andrew Croker, of IMG. Of course they are. Fox are owned
by Rupert Murdoch, who just happens to own BSkyB and soon Man-
chester United. A substantial number of live Sky matches in a season
involve United and so this fits neatly into the 'globalisation' plan of
the [Manchester United] board. Other Murdoch groups which have
Premiership deals include Fox in Australia and Latin and South Amer-
ica as well as JSkyB in Japan, Sky in New Zealand and ESS, a joint
venture with ESPN, in India, Pakistan, Taiwan and the Middle East. It
gives the Premiership access to around 170 million subscribers world-
wide. While there is no suggestion that Fox, ESS or JSkyB will abuse
the contract over the next three years by screening Manchester United
incessantly, even though they can screen whoever they want as their
live match, other clubs will be monitoring the situation. By thinking
they are creating a market for English soccer abroad, the Premier
League might simply be strengthening Manchester United's position.
If the television contract negotiations become a free-for-all in 2001,
with the clubs holding the television rights to their own games, then
no one in the Premiership will be able to rival United's dominance.
Not only will United hold the strongest hand in Britain but they will
also have the agreements in place to attack the American, Far East,
Australian and South American markets- which every Premier club
has identified as key to future expansion in merchandising.
Colin Gibson, How the Sky Fell in on the Premiership, ELECTRONIC
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=000258787
409999&rtmo=lwlnunnt&atmo.. .sfnma2l3. htm>.
207 The United States' extraterritorial application of antitrust law is em-
bodied within what is known as the "effects" doctrine. The effects doctrine,
circumscribed by court cases and statutes, states that a foreign entity may come
under the scrutiny of U.S. antitrust laws if the alleged conduct was intentional
and affects U.S. commerce in a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
manner. See, e.g.., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. § 6a (1997); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945); Stark, supra note 1, at 662.
208 "Certain commentators have argued that U.S. assertions of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction are often problematic and that [U.S.] courts tend to be cavalier
about other nations' interests." Debra A. Valentine, Building A Cooperative
Framework for Oversight in Mergers- The Answer to Extraterritorial Issues in
Merger Review, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 525 (1998); see also Stark, supra note 1,
at 660-62. In general, the degree of extraterritoriality varies greatly from na-
tion to nation. As Guzman notes,
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negative antitrust effect that occurs cross-jurisdictionally in a
product/geographic market sphere that is truly international.
4.2. The Redefinition ofProduct: A Distribution Network
Establishes A Product Network
The key to understanding the fundamental antitrust problem
precipitated by News Corporation is an understanding of the evo-
lution of the News Corporation product. As implied above, the
ultimate product that the News Corporation currently offers the
consumer is a broadcast-media distribution network. Distinct
from the sub-products delivered by the network, the network it-
self is what consumers pay for when they each access the News
Corporation product. Whether the consumer is a citizen of the
United States who pays to view Premier Football League matches
via Fox Sports World or is a citizen of the People's Republic of
China who pays to view ESPN/STAR Sports, the consumer pays
to gain the viewing power that News Corporation affords. The
end-product to the user- that which factors into the user's own
demand curve and preferences- may be the programming op-
tions themselves. Schematically, the current News Corporation
dynamic could be viewed as the following abstract diagram:
Countries vary in their abilities to regulate foreign activity. At one
extreme, for example, is a country that has minimal power over the
behavior of foreign firms because those firms do only a small fraction
of their business in the country and hold no assets there. Such a coun-
try, even if it threatens to deny access to the national market, will be
relatively powerless to affect the behavior of foreign firms. Alterna-
tively, a country may simply decide that it does not wish to apply its
laws to conduct that occurs abroad, leaving foreign conduct beyond its
reach.
Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1501, 1506 (1998). Guzman's comments allude to the connection between
trade and antitrust policy. This connection is further discussed in note 249.
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The diagram graphically delineates how News Corporation's
distribution backbone system operates. The major players that
participate to bring the broadcast-media product to the market
are divided into four categories: product entities, distribution en-
tities, distribution agents and consumers.
* PRoDUCT ENTITIES primarily produce broadcast product.
Television production companies like Twentieth Century Fox
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are the most obvious examples. However, sports teams are
likewise product entities.
* DISTRIBUTION ENTTIES, as the term aptly describes, primarily
focus on the distribution of media product. These entities es-
sentially integrate the connections between different product
entities, in turn amalgamating a package of broadcast items for
delivery to consumers. These entities also house marketing
mechanisms. DBS providers often fill this role. Entities such
as BSkyB, STAR, and DirectTV constitute distribution enti-
ties. In the future, high-speed Internet modem access by cable
and local exchange companies will play a major role in distri-
bution.
" DISTRIBUTIONAGENTS function as intermediaries between dis-
tribution entities and consumers, oftentimes obtaining a pack-
age of broadcast items from a distribution entity and then re-
packaging them for final sale to the consumer. Many cable
companies function as distribution agents. Entities such as
TCI, Comcast/MediaOne, and Time Warner Cable constitute
distribution agents.
The uniqueness of the News Corporation scheme is not so
much in how the business organization is structured- there exist
numerous other media entities that share similar vertically inte-
grative strategies. The benefits of vertical integration are by no
means a novel concept. Rather, it is the extent of the vertical in-
tegration- at numerous points along the horizontal line- that
makes News Corporation unique in its market power.
The more core distribution entities that News Corporation
controls, the more News Corporation gains in furthering control
over both product entities and distribution agents. In attaining
control, News Corporation uses its previously gained core dis-
tributional control as leverage. In many ways, BSkyB controls
both the product entity and distribution agent sides of the broad-
cast equation even though it does not specifically own or directly
control each entity's price structure. While BSkyB may not spe-
cifically own the Premier Football League or particular cable-
based outlets in the U.K., BSkyB wields massive control over
those entities as they depend on the BSkyB product to maintain
their respective minimum efficiency scales. BSkyB also fosters
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control via media partnerships with product producers." 9 With-
out the BSkyB distributional muscle, broadcast video products are
at a disadvantage in market competition, as are U.K. cable outlets
that lack access to competitive programming. Those associated
with BSkyB see BSkyB's way of doing business in a different
light, claiming that "BSkyB has been a force for good in every
sense- it has introduced choice into the market .... I think it's
an amazing company. It's one of the great success stories of our
time. And it will still go from strength to strength.' 210 BSkyB
may have originally infused competitiveness into the British video
broadcast market. That state of competitiveness, however, is now
questionable. 1
Product entities depend on end-user distribution for competi-
tive survival, end-user distribution agents depend on product for
competitive survival, and News Corporation controls the conduit
and major sources of related product that feed this mutually de-
pendent relationship.1 2 Historically, News Corporation has rei-
fied its power control position by expanding its existing distribu-
tional network via merger and acquisition- regardless of what
new technologies emerge in broadcast-media delivery.
Yet, as digital cable and high-speed integrated telecommunica-
tions promise to "level the playing field" in satellite-television-
dominated areas of the world, it is quite possible that the cur-
rent News Corporation distributional dominance will decline.
To a certain ,point, News Corporation is not completely shifting
away from distribution. Even as digital cable begins its initial in-
209 See Erich Boehm, New Co-Ventures Signal Era of Partnerships, VARIETY,
Feb. 1-7, 1999, at 40 [Boehm, New Co-Ventures]. The writer notes that:
[BSkyB] is a partner in several top-brand thematic channels-includ-
ing Nickelodeon (50%), the History Channel (50%), National Geo-
graphic (50%) and Paramount Comedy (25%). It also supplies pro-
gramming to its distribution rivals, cablers Telewest, CWC and NTL,
as well as the digital terrestrial platform ONdigital, and has working
relationships with the established terrestrials, most notably the BBC,
with which it shares rights to English Premier League soccer.
210 Boehm, Stratospheric, supra note 133, at 36 (quoting Sam Chisholm,
former BSkyB chief executive, current consultant to BSkyB).
211 See id.
212 The News Corporation dynamic of perpetuation of power is somewhat
Foucault-like in operation. See 2 MICHEL FOUCAULT, AESTHETICS, METHOD,
AND EPISTEMOLOGY: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984, (James
D. Faubion ed., 1998).
213 1997 KEY NOTE REPORT, supra note 37, at *25.
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roads into the broadcast marketplace, News Corporation is
mounting its own digital cable onslaught, particularly in the
United Kingdom.214 News Corporation is using its current dis-
tributional dominance to leverage a dominant position in the
broadcast marketplace that results from whatever video broad-
cast-media delivery mechanism emerges in the future. News
Corporation is creating this leveraged position by shifting its con-
trol toward content entities and pairing this control with strategic
distribution relationships with different delivery entities.
News Corporation is quickly shifting its focus toward direct
control over specific product entities. In the rapidly evolving
"media-delivery" marketplace, where the ultimate delivery
method of choice is unclear, News Corporation is hedging its
monopolistic bets. As quickly as it gained market power in deliv-
ery, News Corporation is shifting and translating this power into
the media product marketplace. News Corporation leverages its
distributional control to gain this direct control. News Corpora-
tion is also creating strategic partnerships with various delivery
partners in different "integrated" relationships. For example, the
second largest shareholder of News Corporation is cable magnate
John Malone, who, via LibertyMedia, is the largest shareholder of
the telecommunications and cable giant Time Warner.21 While
delivery methods may change, media product is what the con-
sumer desires. Whatever delivery emerges at the end of the cur-
rent evolutionary period, News Corporation will be strongly po-
sitioned by its strategic partnerships providing cheap and efficient
delivery of the product it already controls.
This emerging second stage in the evolution of News Corpo-
ration can be portrayed by the following abstract diagram. While
the entities and structure remain the same as the first schematic,
the control structure changes. The power now flows through
News Corporation, the content owner. News Corporation's
strategic relationships with various methods and providers of
broadcast-media allow it to be strongly positioned, regardless of
which delivery method emerges as the market leader. In this un-
certain delivery climate, control over specific consumer-desired
broadcast-media product leads to the only truly powerful market
214 See Digital Television Introduction, supra note 53; see also supra notes 51-
54 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
AOL-Time Warner merger, see supra notes 26, 60 and accompanying text.
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position. Power thus shifts from distribution to the content
owner, in the following manner:
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4.3. The Pragmatic Problems ofRegulating the Anti-competitive
Conduct of News Corporation
On purely a functional level, attempting to regulate the anti-
competitive conduct of News Corporation presents myriad inef-
ficiencies and difficulties. All of these problems share a common
cause- nation-based antitrust regulation- and a common re-
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sult- differentiated treatment. When large vertically and hori-
zontally integrated multinational entities like News Corporation
enter the regulatory picture, the inefficiencies only become mag-
nified. Significant conflicts of law questions arise, mutual full
faith and credit between countries begins to slip, and national
sovereignty becomes an all too familiar defense mechanism.
Many of these differentiated treatment problems begin as
questions about jurisdiction. Valid jurisdiction in the antitrust
context varies, as always, from forum to forum. The elements
themselves, however, usually remain the same from nation to na-
tion, encompassing, in some manner, competitive effects, product
market, and geographic market.216
216 In some balance, the combination of above mentioned factors must be
such that the regulating nation has some valid interest in actual regulation of
the transaction. The difficulty lies in how competition regulators choose to
circumscribe these elements. A jurisdiction that certainly has an interest in the
transaction, but has no underlying structural power to adjudicate that particu-
lar transaction, gives one pause to wonder how effectively such jurisdictional
constraints may operate in reality. See G. Porter Elliott, Learning to Fly: The
European Commission Enters Unfamiliar Skies in its Review of the British Air-
ways-American Airlines Alliance, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 160-61 (1998).
Elliot describes how the European Commission competition regulators ma-
nipulated their grant of authority in exercising jurisdiction in the politically
pivotal British Airways/American Airlines ("BA/AA") alliance case:
Despite having based its review of the BA/AA alliance on a virtually
obsolete treaty provision, the Commission refused to acknowledge its
relative legal impotence, remaining resolute amidst challenges to
its ... established antitrust systems. Rightly or wrongly, the Com-
mission established itself as a regulatory body to be taken seriously on
both sides of the Atlantic in a sector where its extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion for so long had been unclear.
Id (citations omitted).
The BA/AA alliance case pitted the EC against British competition regula-
tors in a battle for regulatory power. Obviously, the EC won out, yet, in
terms of pragmatic implications for the EU as a whole, the case resonates on a
larger level: "The possibility of concurrent reviews by the Commission and
Member States has given rise to a battle of competencies, which, based on its
actions in the BA/AA case, it appears the Commission is winning by might, if
not by right." Id. at 163. Simply stated, the BA/AA case only firther under-
scores how antitrust jurisdiction is, at its core, a result of political considera-
tions, regardless of the structural legal gymnastics in which a competition regu-
latory agency must engage to "validly" obtain jurisdiction. Validity, as critical
legal scholarship is quick to point out, is all relative, and thus, reality (which
itself is pure conjecture and artifice) is purely indeterminate. See Eric K. Wein-
arten, Comment, An Indeterminate Mix of Due Process and Equal Protection:
he Undertow ofn Forma Pauperis, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 651 (1998). As
one of the authors of this Article duly noted,
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Multiple problems ensue from the threshold issue of jurisdic-
tion.217 Conceivably, a country that is relatively unaffected by a
transaction could still potentially enforce some sort of jurisdiction
over a particular transaction. An affected nation might prefer to
turn a blind eye to the anti-competitive effects of a particular
transaction and not pursue jurisdiction where it rightfully could.
The regulatory situation becomes even more convoluted when
anti-competitive conduct affects multiple nations in different
ways. The current structure of nation-based antitrust regulation
precipitates a host of jurisdictional determinations that either con-
flict, are unnecessarily duplicative, or are inadequate. These juris-
dictional conflicts lead to the next pragmatic problem- substan-
tive conflict of antitrust law application.
The larger problems surrounding substantive application of
varying antitrust law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction are obvious
and well known. Conduct allowable in one jurisdiction may not
be legal in another jurisdiction. The practical complications aris-
ing from these basic conflicts of law, however, are more subtle
when dealing with a continuously evolving new product- par-
ticularized by the News Corporation dynamic.
The following scenario demonstrates this subtle complication.
News Corporation- a multinational conglomerate- does most
of its business in the United States. Among other places, News
Corporation also holds assets in Europe, China, and Australia.
News Corporation attempts to merge with Company B, which is
The radical indeterminacy argument can be drawn out to absurd
lengths. Taken to extremes, everything, anywhere in the universe, is
entirely indeterminate because it can only be defined relative to some-
thing else. That "something else" itself must be defined before it can
be used in relation to the original object, color, shape, etc., for defini-
tional purposes. In turn, the "something else" is defined in relation to
another "something else," and so on, and so on ad nauseum. So every
[legal] term.., is in the purest sense indeterminate. However...
some terms can be defined with sufficient determinacy if placed in a
quantifiable matrix.
Id.
All absurdity aside, the point should now be painfully clear. Current nation-
based jurisdictional constructs are too vague to supply a sufficient amount of
determinacy. In other words, the current antitrust matrix is simply not suffi-
ciently quantifiable. Jurisdictional questions currently present a rather easy
avenue for political considerations to overtake quality economic analysis in the
totality of the antitrust regulatory calculus.
217 See discussion supra note 216.
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headquartered in Australia. Company B also holds assets in
China. By law, both companies must file for pre-merger notifica-
tion in both the United States and the European Union. Yet,
while no pre-merger notification is required in China, due to a ju-
risdictional clause in China's regulatory code, China decides to
challenge the merger (despite no pre-notification requirement).
The merger is allowed by both the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. China blocks the merger and freezes the assets in
China of News Corporation and Company B until both agree to
consent decrees.
Despite the high cost involved, the transaction may proceed,
regardless of the proceedings in China. Due to the ethereal na-
ture of the broadcast-media product,218 it is likely that News Cor-
poration and Company B will proceed with the merger in some
capacity, and begin service as a new entity in the United States
and the European Union. It obtains consent decrees, ordering a
partial sale of assets, some of which are based in Australia. News
Corporation/Company B fails to assent to the signed decree. In
turn, a China-based competitor of News Corporation/Company
B seeks to have the consent decree enforced by an Australian
court. The Australian court refuses to enforce the consent decree
on the grounds that China had no valid jurisdiction to mandate
disposal of Australian-based assets.
The above scenario may never see fruition, since faced with
mounting litigation or administrative costs, the newly formed
company- News Corporation/Company B- may just choose to
sell off assets in China to avoid any further costs. Either way,
while China maintains its sovereignty in antitrust, the efficient re-
sult disappears. When such results ensue, other companies be-
come more cautious about entering into similar transactions.219
21 In other words, the broadcast-media product is one that is inherently
intangible, constantly changing, and difficult to define. The myriad transmis-
sion methods perpetuates the difficulty in regulating and"containing" such a
product.
219 It is true that such uncertainty of legal treatment often causes parties to
agree to contract provisions for the resolution of future problems. Such impe-
tus has spawned the growth and concomitant world acceptance of arbitra-
tion- a sort of "privatization" of the law. Arbitration essentially allows par-
ties to limit uncertainty, and in turn contract more freely. See Stephan J.
Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitra-
tion, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999). Unfortunately, the nature of antitrust is
public, and as such arbitration, while somewhat useful in the abstract, has very
little substantive value to antitrust regulation. The proposal forwarded by this
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Particularly if China oversteps reasonable jurisdiction, the origi-
nal action creates what amounts to negative externalities in the
form of unneeded transaction costs and subsequent international
business stalemate. These transaction costs manifest themselves in
other companies' hesitance to enter into similar transactions in
the future. In such a business environment, where efficient pro-
competitive mergers such as the News Corporation/Company B
merger are discouraged or thwarted, global Pareto efficiency is
lost.
4.4. The Limitations of the Current Theoretical Underpinnings
ofAntitrust Regulation in the Context of News
Corporation's Transactions of International Effect
The primary thrust of the antitrust concern surrounding the
expansion of News Corporation is excessive concentration of
economic power.' ° The concern over News Corporation's, and
article offers an arbitral element. It is, however, meant as a supplement to the
antitrust regulatory matrix; a supplement that is intended to efficiently manage
antitrust disputes that arise between two contracting parties-at this point a
small minority of antitrust cases. It is envisioned that consistent antitrust arbi-
tration results may encourage future contracting parties to include such arbitral
provisions, and in turn, foster greater confidence and predictability in the sub-
stantive application of antitrust law. A more efficient global market may re-
sult, averting the market inefficiencies discussed in this section.
220 See Ilene Knable Gotts, The Competitive Analysis of Communications
and Entertainment Mergers, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS: FINANCING, REGULATORY, AND BUSINESS ISSUES 1998, at 27,
29-31 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1060,
1998). Gotts delineates antitrust law's historical penchant for aspiring to
achieve noble goals- goals that, while resonating with economic justification,
strove to actively pursue equality and free access in markets. Id. Early on, in
combating oppressive railroad monopolies in the late 1800s and with the pas-
sage of the Sherman Act in 1890, it was clear that antitrust had to be more than
an economic concern. This is supported by Senator Sherman's statement, "If
we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not endure a king
over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessities of life."
Id. at 29 (quoting Senator Sherman, found in A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13 (2d ed. 1970)). Gotts notes that
with advent and popularization of the Chicago School in the late 1970s and
1980s, political factors became de-emphasized in the antitrust calculus. See id.
at 30-31. However, with respect to media antitrust issues specifically, Gotts
points to a resurgence in recognizing the political concerns raised by concen-
tration in the media industries. To illustrate, she quotes Robert Pitofsky, cur-
rent chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, "Because I think
decentralization in the media is central to a democratic society, I think you
might want to pay more attention to mergers in book .. . magazine, newspa-
per or electronic media.. . [i]n those industries, there is more at stake than
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in turn Murdoch's, growing control over an information and
knowledge medium mirror the traditional fear of oppressive mo-
nopolistic power." Despite such equation in underlying political
theory something is lost in the regulatory transposition of this
concern upon the situation at hand. Nation-based analysis, as
mentioned throughout this article, supplies the front-end of the
answer to why this analysis is so. These inadequacies of nation-
based antitrust law, however, are merely the outgrowth of the
underlying theoretical economic deficiencies, particularly those
emanating from a lack of rational expectations analysis integrated
into traditional antitrust calculus. On the most basic terms, these
theoretical deficiencies inhibit regulators' abilities to fully de-
scribe and inspect consumers' and firms' internationalized reac-
tions to the 'domestic' business conduct of News Corporation.'
high prices or low quality to consumers- there is a more fundamental issue of
avoiding centralized control over access to the [marketplace] of ideas." Id. at
31 (quoting Robert Pitofsky, in Jube Shriver, Jr., FTC to Broaden Investigation
of Media Deal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at D1, and Testimony of Robert Pi-
tofsky before the Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopolies and Business Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Committee 8-9 (Dec. 16, 1993)).
221 See 54A AM. JUR. S 789 (1996) (citing a basis for antitrust statutes as the
desire to "protect people from the possible tyranny and oppression of com-
bined wealth"); see also Walther A. Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideol.
ogy, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (1995).
2 On a purely economic level, current antitrust policy and practice is
fundamentally rooted in Keynesian economic theory. At its most basic,
Keynesian economic policy rests on the belief that markets in the real world
are imperfect where "[t]he failure of prices to adjust to clear markets is a cen-
tral element of [the root economic model]." ROBERT J. BARRO,
MACROECONOMICS 593 (4th ed. 1993). Granted, Keynesian theory underlies
even the most advanced current scholarship in economics; however, it is an
understatement to say that economics has become more sophisticated since the
advent of the bulk of antitrust case law. The problem is rather simple. Cur-
rent antitrust law, particularly that in the United States, performs what is es-
sentially a static, "historical snap-shot" analysis. However, in the 1970s and
1980s, the rational expectations school of economics emerged, demonstrating
the tragic failures of exactly such a type of static macroeconomic policy analy-
sis. For all its advancement over the past 20 years, antitrust law has failed to
account for such realization. The rational expectations school has in a sense,
left antitrust behind. While economists in the 1980s went about "a well de-
fined and compelling research agenda- the application of rational expectations
to the policy world- which is now more-or-less complete," this task seems to
be less complete in the area of antitrust, ironically one of the most identifiably
'economic' of legal areas. Journey Beyond the Stars: The Brightest Young Econo.
mists are Outgrowing Their Discipline's Traditional Boundaries, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 19, 1998, at 108. Rational expectations theory has been described as"a
reaction against Keynesian thought which formalised the idea that people learn
from their mistakes...." Id. at 107. The foundations of the rational expecta-
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As a broad generalization, competition regulations operate as
functions of historically based data. That is, when government
regulators and agencies across the world undertake competitive
analysis of business activity, they rely upon historical data to
draw conclusions about future competitive impact. While these
analytical structures are readily evident in merger/acquisitions
regulation,' they are no less structurally determinative in analy-
sis of anti-competitive conduct itself. 4 The current inability to
assess the impact of News Corporation transactions in a manner
that accounts for international changes in consumer preferences
and firm budget functions structurally limits regulators in pursu-
ing valid regulatory justification.
When antitrust regulators examine mergers, common areas of
analysis include concentration numbers (commonly calculated as
the HI-I), both product and geographic market definition and
concentration analysis, competitive effect, and entry-factors."
The current methods of examining each area fail to recognize the
above-described dynamic and, in turn, miss the structural changes
in the marketplace that allow News Corporation to enjoy an in-
ternational monopolistic position.
HHIl numbers are based on historical percentage concentra-
tions in particular product and geographic markets. 6 While it is
tions approach are rooted in the idea that if economic models of policy choices
do not account for individuals' (and corporations', for that matter) reactions to
those policy choices themselves, the economic model as a whole is internally
set-up for failure. THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS REVOLUTION xiv (Preston
J. Miller ed., MIT Press 1994). It is important to note that antitrust policymak-
ing, primarily done in an informal manner via agency and government guide-
lines, consent decrees, pre-merger analysis, and case law, does not completely
mirror the sort of macroeconomic policymaking anticipated by the pure ra-
tional expectations school of thought. Regardless, on a more abstract scale, an-
titrust legal analysis can be critiqued by rational expectations, as firms' and in-
dividuals' budgets and cost structures are directly affected by particular
decisions of the antitrust regulatory agencies.
223 See, e.g., The 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Horizontal Merger Guidelines (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www
.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz book/hmgl.html> [hereinafter U.S.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines]; The 198-9 Merger Regulations, European Com-
munity (visited- Feb. 7, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1989/
en_389R4064.html> [hereinafter EU Merger Regulations].
224 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d. 263 (2d
Cir. 1979) (analyzing- in an abuse of market power case- historical market
concentrations for both plaintiff and defendant).
2 See, e.g., U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 223.
226 See id. (describing market concentration and the compilations of HHI).
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true that HHI numbers are merely a threshold element in the an-
titrust regulatory calculus, they create problems in light of cur-
rent theoretical economic assumptions. If individuals and firms
adjust preference and budget curves in response to government
'regulation,' then these numbers are likely to be inaccurate in
predicting any future concentrations after a particular merger.
Regulation in this context can be understood liberally- any ac-
tion by the government with respect to the merger: approval, dis-
approval, consent decree, can be seen as macroeconomic policy to
which consumers and firms react. Product and geographic mar-
ket analysis both fail in a similar regard to concentration analysis.
Product and geographic market analysis are commonly done by
specifically analyzing consumer demand preferences between dif-
ferent goods and services. Again, if individuals adjust demand
preference and budget curves in response to government 'regula-
tion,' any demand preference or budget calculation based upon
historical data is likely to be inaccurate in predicting any future
consumer response after a particular merger.
Anti-competitive effect and entry factors are commonly de-
termined by looking at firm production curves and responses to
particular conduct.' While all of these factors focus analysis of
the transaction in a normal stochastic manner, they do so based
upon data and assumptions that are grounded in the normal cur-
rent budgetary constraints of firms. Not only does this analysis
fail to take into account how the competitive marketplace will re-
act specifically to the transaction and regulation, but the analysis
also fails to account for the changes in firm budgetary constraints
that precipitate from technology advances, as manifested by News
Corporation conduct."8 Regulation of non-merger conduct fails
on virtually identical grounds. If firms adjust their production
choices in response to government 'regulation,' any firm produc-
tion choice calculation based upon historical data is likely to be
inaccurate in predicting any future firm response after a particular
merger.
Specific to the News Corporation regulatory dilemma, this
problem is exacerbated when consumers and firms react in an in-
ternational manner upon regulation by antitrust authorities.
117 See HERBERT HOvERKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (1994).
22s See discussion supra Section 3.
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While News Corporation purchases entities that participate in
domestic product markets, these purchases change the expecta-
tions of consumers and competing firms alike. When News Cor-
poration makes these purchases, consumers react to a fundamen-
tal change in what products are now available to them. The
News Corporation conduct alters the product offered, creating a
more international product. Thus, consumers reclassify the News
Corporation product, making formerly competitive products and
services less attractive. News Corporation conduct forces for-
merly competitive firms to reassess in which product market they
compete. Firms must reassess their ability to compete with the
formerly non-News Corporation entity. As the News Corpora-
tion product and influence become more international, consum-
ers shift their preferences and firms must change their production
curves accordingly. Oftentimes firms determine that they will be
unable to continue competing with the former non-News Corpo-
ration entity because the entity now constitutes a smaller part of a
larger, differentiated product whole. News Corporation's trans-
actions change the structure of broadcast-media competition.
What appear to be domestic competitive entities are really the
domestic front-ends of an international broadcast-media product.
Former competitors cease to be competitors.
Very simply, when concentration data (HHI or otherwise) is
based on historical, non-international concentrations and the sub-
stantive economic fallout from a particular merger is interna-
tional, government regulators are likely to miss the major anti-
trust concerns. As such, News Corporation transactions that
facilitate the creation of an international product market structure
that previously did not exist are less likely to be caught via the
initial concentration threshold web. Similarly, in the heart of
regulatory analysis, regulators are likely to examine consumer
demand and firm production capabilities and responses in a
framework that is unable to accurately predict and incorporate
consumer and firm adjustment to the particular regulatory re-
sponse itself.
The regulatory solution to the rational expectations critique is
one of subtle change. The News Corporation dilemma elucidates
how one might conquer the critique. The key is that the method
of analysis must change. The method of antitrust analysis itself
must allow regulators to speculate on how consumers and firms
may react to the regulatory response, and in turn, adjust their
2000]
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preferences/budgetary constraints. Such alterations in consumer
demand and firm supply elasticities would be internally ac-
counted for via a movement away from total reliance on histori-
cal data. Replacing this total reliance would be a concomitant
emphasis on econometric analysis that would allow for alterations
in relevant variables (i.e., demonstrating changes in con-
sumer/firm expectations) in accord with variances in "antitrust
policy" (i.e., different regulatory) outcomes. Such actual meth-
odological adjustment should go far in enabling regulators to cap-
ture the growing international anti-competitive effects of transac-
tions like those of News Corporation. While such structural
change in analysis may enable nation-based antitrust regulators to
capture more of an international focus, as we shall see in the next
section, it is nation-based antitrust regulation itself that can be the
ultimate limiting factor- even in the context of an internation-
ally cooperative antitrust proposal.
5. THE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST DEBATE & NEWS
CORPORATION
Product demand is becoming more international in nature,
and thus a force in the globalization of the product markets them-
selves. On a specific broadcast-media level, News Corporation
helps further market globalization. Broadly speaking, "globaliza-
tion of markets has led inevitably to proposals for the globaliza-
tion of antitrust." 9 On a pragmatic level, the international as-
pects of competition regulation are commonplace. As an
attorney in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice noted, "Dealing with transnational competition issues- and
" Some of the reasons cited for this proliferation include: attempts to rec-
oncile competition policy and trade policy driven by a"growing recognition of
links" between the two (see generall infra note 259); "the growing number of
countries that enforce reasonably comprehensive and sophisticated systems of
competition law has produced pressure from the business community and na-
tiona governments to work toward more uniform systems of notification by
private parties and greater cooperation between national authorities, and has
created a desire for more uniform rules of both jurisdiction and substantive
law"; substantive and enforcement conflict between nations over antitrust law;
and the proliferation of "new competition regimes in developing market
economies." Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Har.
monization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 560 (1994);
see also Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust: Against Minimum Rules; For
Cosmopolitan Principles, ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1998) (discussing the globaliza-
tion of markets).
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working with our counterparts at competition agencies in other
countries- are now a regular, everyday part of our work."'O
The international antitrust quandary results directly from .the fact
that, while many transactions reside in a global economy, there is
no concomitant international regulatory structure to mediate that
economy."
International antitrust regulation is a frequently debated sub-
ject. The debate focuses on either the harmonization of antitrust
laws themselves,2 the creation of a system of comity in the con-
text of nation-based antitrust regulation, or a movement toward a
world regime in a context similar to that of the WTO. This sec-
tion presents a brief outline of the current approaches to solving
230 A. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International
Deregulation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437, 437 (1998). Melamed was Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice at the time of writing; he delivered the article as a speech at a sympo-
sium at George Mason Law School. See id. Melamed notes,
Nearly 30 percent of the Antitrust Division's enforcement work in-
volves international or transnational matters.
Last year [1996], fines imposed for criminal antitrust violations ex-
ceeded $200 million- by far the largest amount ever- and most of
that came from international cartel activity.
The Division .. .had 25 [then] active grand jury investigations into
possible international cartels, with potential defendants from more
than 20 different foreign countries on 4 different continents.
On the civil side, too, both the Division and the FTC regularly deal
with antitrust issues of global significance: mergers like BT/MCI and
Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz and non-merger civil investigations like the now-
settled investigations by the EC and the Antitrust Division of Micro-
soft.
Id.
231 See id. Melamed adds,
While we live in a global economy, however, we do not live in a
global state. There is no international antitrust code, nor are there in-
ternational rules for resolving issues of jurisdiction and enforcement
procedure. A key challenge facing all of us who are interested in
competition policy is how to deal with transnational competition
problems in a global economy in the absence of a global state- how,
in the absence of international rules, to deal with the increasingly
common phenomenon of marketplace conduct that takes place in one
nation but has harmful effects in another nation.
Id. at 438.
22 See, e.g., Waller, supra note 229.
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the international antitrust quandary using News Corporation to
demonstrate the limitations of each of these proposals.
5.1. Current Approaches to International Antitrust Regulation
Three basic international antitrust approaches are found in the
literature and in practice: harmonization, 233 structuralized com-
ity," and "overarchin, framework principles" modeled in some
sort of WTO context. Harmonization holds that antitrust pol-
icy and practice can be molded into one coherent set of rules and
procedures. Structuralized comity works from the opposite an-
gle, utilizing "unilateral action including positive comity," 236 or
bilateral agreements that institutionalize comity. The overarch-
ing framework principles approach is somewhat of a hybrid, in-
volving multinational treaties in which participating nations as-
sent to a broad policy list of antitrust principles that require the
extensive use of positive comity (either self-imposed or via bilat-
eral/multinational agreement).
In the very broadest sense, the advocates of harmonization be-
lieve that the concept of antitrust, as positive law, is transferable
from nation to nation, culture to culture, jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion."J Among the efforts toward harmonization, "[f]ive great
attempts have been made to achieve a true international harmoni-
zation of competition law in the twentieth century," and "[n]one
has been successful."" 8 Current proposals for harmonization take
various approaches:
The 1990s blueprint for international harmonization of
antitrust law includes proposals for changing the jurisdic-
tion over transnational anti-competitive behavior, the pro-
233 See id.
234 See, e.g., Rill, supra note 3.
235 Fox, supra note 229, at 5 n.1.
236 Id. at 5.
237 See Waller, supra note 229, at 562-69 (discussing the transferability of
national law in a political theory/socio-political context, and relating that dis-
cussion specifically to the transferability of antitrust law).
238 Id. at 558. Waller lists the following five: the League of Nations, the
International Trade Organization ("ITO") [proposed], the Economic and So-
cial Council of the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development ("OECD"), and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development. See id. at 558-59.
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cedures for investigation of transnational competition
matters and the substance of competition law, and sugges-
tions for promoting antitrust enforcement in foreign mar-
kets as a means to enhance United States export and in-
vestment opportunities. 9
A large push for harmonization has come from the United
States, arguably the world's most experienced and active antitrust
regulator. The U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies- the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission- and the
American Bar Association have been instrumental in efforts to
export U.S.-style antitrust regulation to Japan, the Soviet Repub-
lics, and the developing economies in Eastern Europe.24 This
wholesale exportation has been viewed by some as nationalistic-
protecting U.S. trade interests abroad, using the export of U.S.-
style antitrust law as a "trade weapon."241 Under this protection-
ist rhetoric, American antitrust law is "competing with the com-
petition law of the EU for the hearts and minds of eastern
Europe." 242
The antitrust regulations promulgated by the EU harmonize
antitrust law across national boundaries. The EU, via various
constitutional and statutory mechanisms, enforces substantive an-
titrust and competition law found in the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community ("Treaty of Rome"- 1957).
The majority of regulation is directly administered by Directorate
General IV ("DG-IV") headquartered in Brussels.243 Cases are
brought by the processes of notification, complaints, or public
knowledge.2' Member States of the EU have varying national en-
239 Id. at 559-60.
240 See id, at 569-70.
241 Id. at 571.
242 Id. at 570. While the validity of exporting antitrust law is seen as
rooted in positive law, this "competition" between the United States and EU
reeks of normative legal judgement, as the following comment demonstrates,
"EU competition provisions... 'may do too much to protect individual com-
petitors rather than the competitive process.'" Id. (quoting Janet Steiger, for-
mer Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission).
243 See Barry E. Hawk & Laraine L. Laudati, Antitrust Federalism in the
United States and Decentralization of Competition Law Enforcement in the Euro-
pean Union:A Comparison, 20 FoRDHAMINT'LL. J. 18, 31 (1996).
244 See id.
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forcement authority.' Generally speaking, substantive EU law
supercedes national law.246 The Draft International Antitrust
Code was another effort towards harmonization.24 Proposed by
a group of antitrust scholars, the Draft was a direct attempt at
implementing a unifying minimum set of antitrust standards to be
adopted by the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") nations.4
Positive comity is a much more common approach to the
problem of transnational antitrust regulation. 9  Under tradi-
tional bilateral agreements, positive antitrust comity between na-
tions occurs when one
[c]ountry may request another country to take enforce-
ment action against domestic anti-competitive activity af-
fecting the ability of the requesting county's firms to
compete in the market of the requested country. Under
this voluntary approach, an agency which is notified of
possible anti-competitive activities within its borders must
consider the foreign enforcement authority's request for
assistance but retains complete discretion as to whether to
initiate or expand enforcement activities."
The United States and the EU entered this type of agreement
in 1991, "allowing the respective jurisdictions' competition
authorities to exchange information and coordinate joint investi-
245 See id. at 33. This authority varies "depending upon whether the spe-
cific Member State has adopted necessary enabling egislation," and also de-
pending on the specific national antitrust body's "degree of autonomy from
political influence in executing [its] powers." Id
246 See id, at 34 n.75.
247 See Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at
Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4-5 (1997)
(arguing that the Draft International Antitrust Code, while an important event
in the movement towards harmonization, fails to establish an international an-
titrust law that works).
248 See id.
249 See Guzman, supra note 208, at 1505 (presenting some reasons why this
may be the case). "Bilateral negotiations provide the most promising forum
for reaching agreement [on antitrust policy] because they require only two
countries to agree that cooperation will increase national welfare, and transfer
payments through concessions in other areas of dispute are more likely." Id.
250 Rill, supra note 3, at 322.
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gations." 2 In 1994 the European Court of Justice invalidated
this agreement on procedural grounds.5 2 Regardless, some com-
mentators propose a further exploration of this direction of in-
ternational antitrust enforcement, working from an EU/U.S. ba-
sis." On a somewhat different level, the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act ("IAEAA") authorized "the DOJ
and the FTC to negotiate bilateral 'mutual assistance agreements'
with foreign antitrust authorities, under which the agencies
would make requests of foreign authorities for evidence located
abroad, as well as consider requests from foreign authorities for
evidence located in the United States." 4 IAEAA is recognized as
a "commendable first step" towards "[ciloser cooperation be-
tween antitrust authorities [that] is necessary to achieve more ef-
fective [antitrust] enforcement as the process of market globaliza-
tion and liberalization continues.""5
The overarching framework principles approach is offered as
a "pragmatic" solution to the international antitrust quandary
and as an alternative to harmonization and unilateral employ-
ment of positive comity. Key principles include national en-
forcement, procedural safeguards with access to national courts,
and choice of law rules "where the significant antitrust effects are
localized within one nation." 26  One proposal uses the WTO's
TRIPs agreement as a model.25" The proposal's set of principles
focuses on having participating nations: (1) assent to the creation
and enforcement of antitrust laws; (2) recognize and account for
"global impacts" in antitrust analysis; (3) respect antitrust laws of
other nations through positive comity agreements; (4) recognize
other nations interests; (5) implement safeguards of due process;
251 Id.
252 See Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641,
3662.
253 See Valentine, supra note 208, at 525 ("[The EU and United States] have
a cooperative framework.., for reviewing mergers with transborder effects
and need such a framework with other countries.").
25' Laraine L. Laudati & Todd J. Friedbacher, Trading Secrets- The Inter-
national Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 478,
480 (1996).
255 Id. at 496.
256 Fox, supra note 229, at 6.
257 Id. at 8-9.
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and (6) use dispute resolution when any of the principles are vio-
lated by another signing nation.258
5.2. Critique of Current Approaches to International Antitrust
Regulation
If News Corporation were to be regulated under any of these
nation-based proposals, the true international antitrust issues
would be overlooked. The full range of anti-competitive effects
that derive from News Corporation's activities take shape only in
an international marketplace. While a particular media acquisi-
tion may not look anti-competitive in the nation in which the
transaction occurs, these transactions build Murdoch's world-
wide distribution and content network. A particular transaction
may be highly beneficial to consumers in the country of origin
because the transaction brings new broadcast-media choices. The
country of origin may also be a developing nation and view the
capital influx as a domestic welfare benefit. At the same time, the
transaction at issue could very well be anti-competitive on an in-
ternational marketplace level." 9
258 See id.
'59 This paragraph subtly raises the connection between antitrust and trade
regulation. This is no coincidence. There is growing sentiment among schol-
ars that antitrust regulation and trade policy need to be cohesive to be effective.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New
Protectionism: The Needfor a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 393 (1994) (addressing the conflict between protectionist antitrust
policy and true free trade, a conflict that is a common result of nation-based
antitrust regulation); Christopher M. Barbuto, Note, Toward Convergence of
Antitrust and Trade Law: An International Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 2047 (1994) (suggesting how the convergence of antitrust
and trade laws can both encourage competition and protect domestic interests).
What seems to be occurring in developing nations, however, is just the op-
posite. In these nations, government regulators and politicians alike are jump-
ing at the opportunity to allow foreign corporate trade and investment. China
has increasingly encouraged investment in its media sector by News Corpora-
tion. See News Corporation, News Corporation Optimistic About China Market
(visited Mar. 5, 1999) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/news/index.
html>. This capital influx often occurs at the expense of domestic producers
and the long-term stability of a domestic economy. There is some evidence of
concern over such trends. In this context one scholar recognizes the need for
specialized merger regulation schemes in emerging economies. See William E.
Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions in
Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075 (1998).
One antitrust publication recognized the connection between trade and an-
titrust policy in offering a pragmatic solution for global businesses confronted
with antitrust concerns of an international nature: "In light of [the] potential
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Against this collective backdrop of political economy, the
overriding difficulty with many of the current proposals lies in
their reliance on a nation-based perspective in the administration
of antitrust lawY.2 1 Without eradicating this bias from the anti-
trust calculus, News Corporation's transactions will continue to
be viewed through filters predisposed to favoring transactions
that benefit the home-regulating nation.26'
for international conflict and the absence of any likely early movement for
'harmonization' of merger review standards or procedures, global businesses
need to be aware not only of their antitrust risks, but also of the importance of
international trade law as a means of dispute resolution." Michael L. Weiner,
Conflict and Cooperation: Meeting the Challenge of Increasing Globalization, 12
ANTITRUST 4 (Fall 1997). The connection between antitrust and trade regula-
tion, while quite intriguing and relevant, is beyond the direct scope of this pa-
per.
26 The nationalist tone is not solely confined to the purely 'national-
sphere' of antitrust regulation. The recent actions of the EU in both the Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas merger case and the British Airways/American Air-
lines alliance case demonstrate that extraterritorial action is at its root driven
by protectionist rhetoric and goals-even outside of the purely national regu-
latory context. Some scholars suggest that in these cases the EU overstepped
its constitutionally granted authority (as embodied in the Treaty of Rome in
its efforts to protect the competitive environment for home (EU-based) firms.
See, e.g., G. Porter Elliott, Learning to Fly: The European Commission Enters Un-
familiar Skies in its Review of the British Airways-American Airlines Alliance, 64
J. AIR L. & CoM. 157 (1998) (providing detailed analysis of the EU's actions
with respect to the British Airways/American Airlines alliance); Amy Ann
Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the Boeing.
McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the
Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (providing a detailed analysis of
the EU's actions with respect to the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger).
261 The aforementioned approaches to international antitrust regulation
also fail on the more abstract, secondary level of economic analysis. Each of
the proposals creates a myriad of "transaction costs" that discourage a nation
from participating in a manner of full faith, credit, and disclosure with other
nations. Such an apprehensive and defensive posture in regulation further ex-
plains the unfortunate result of many of the proposals-a nation putting its
own antitrust concerns before others in extraterritorial enforcement of anti-
trust law.
The issue of transaction costs in "the development and operation of inter-
national institutions," as delineated by William J. Aceves is an intriguing one.
Aceves, supra note 6, at 1003. Aceves works from. a definition of transaction
costs borne out of the work of Ronald Coase (the"Coase Theorem") and re-
fined by Oliver Williamson. See id. at 1006-07 (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-52 (1985)). In Aceves's final cal-
culation, these costs-monetary or otherwise-are associated with the con-
flicts that a nation faces (within itself and with other nations) in maintaining
the upkeep and efficient operation of an international cooperative institution
(governance or otherwise). See Aceves, supra note 6, at 1006-07. The greater
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the transaction costs of participation, the less likely nations are to form inter-
national organizations. See id. at 1016-18. Aceves notes the consequences of
such transaction costs: "First, states may face costly adjustments to address un-
foreseen contingencies. Second, states may seek to extract quasi-rents from
other states through opportunistic behavior." Id. at 1016-17. Aceves points out
that states can avoid such transaction costs through two types of international
governance structures: exogenous and endogenous. See id. at 1018, 1022-23.
He describes exogenous government structures as
Exogenous governance structures address the problems raised by
transaction costs by authorizing a third party to address any disputes
or unforeseen developments that may arise in the course of the rela-
tionship. The third party acts as an independent actor with no interest
in the substantive matter of the parties' relationship. Exogenous struc-
tures can take several forms, including arbitration and judicial settle-
ment.
Exogenous governance structures apply the basic rules of the game to
the myriad of unanticipated contingencies and disputes that may arise
in the relationship. The inherent flexibility of these structures is one
of their more powerful attributes. These structures can administer the
rules developed by the parties, monitor adherence to these rules, and
publicize transgressions. In order to succeed, the parties must recog-
nize the binding nature of the decisions made by exogenous structures.
Id. at 1018. Aceves describes endogenous governance structures in the follow-
ing manner:
In contrast to exogenous governance structures, endogenous structures
allow states to address the problems raised by transaction costs within
the context of their relationship. Unlike exogenous structures, en-
dogenous structures do not rely upon a third party or other outside
mechanism to resolve disputes. Rather, disputes are resolved by the
parties within the course of their relationship.
The concept of endogenous governance structures is consistent with
transaction cost economics, which recognizes the advantages of in-
formal structures over more formal and structured mechanisms for
dispute settlement. Indeed, endogenous governance is 'based on em-
pirical evidence and growing sentiment among legal scholars and prac-
titioners that legal centralism places far too much emphasis on formal
written contracts and their effective adjudication in courts of law.'
Rather, transaction cost economics focuses 'on private ordering and
the concept of contract as framework.' Unlike formal adjudication,
informal governance structures are not confrontational in nature. By
emphasizing the relationship, they encourage cooperation rather than
conflict. Informal structures are Also more flexible than the adjudica-
tory process. They offer a quicker solution than more formalized dis-
pute settlement mechanisms can provide.
Id. at 1022-23.
It is the author's belief that none of the previously noted approaches to in-
ternational antitrust regulation fully embrace this attempt at exhuming transac-
tion costs. Nation-based analysis, regardless of the context, in one way or an-
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Proposals advocating the harmonization of antitrust law262
make a normative determination regarding the correct vision of
antitrust263 and often are forwarded to economically favor certain
nations.2" In the context of the News Corporation, this har-
monization would fail in two ways: 1) the harmonized law
would not fully capture the international anti-competitive effects
of News Corporation's behavior and 2) any harmonized law265
still would be implemented on a nation-based basis. Considering
what the common causes of international antitrust disputes are,
harmonization seems ill-fated because "[g]enerally, [antitrust con-
flicts among nations] have been caused by nonenforcement of
law, different interpretations of permissible extraterritoriality,
and nationalistic action that is either protectionist, blindered to
global impacts, in disregard of sovereign prerogatives, or the
credible perception that one of the above has occurred."266
These sorts of problems are certain to arise under the News
Corporation scenario, and they would only continue under the
application of any sort of common antitrust law. As decisions
begin to economically favor certain nations, disfavored nations
other prohibits the efficient functioning of exogenous or endogenous struc-
tures. This reality, as it is merely a subtext of this article, will be noted in in-
fra notes 289-92. The topic of transaction costs must be analyzed in a more in-
depth manner before any more serious conclusions can be drawn about their
substantive impact on the analysis of this paper. The critique that follows in
the ensuing footnotes is therefore placed merely to provoke discussion, debate,
and future study.
262 These proposals are neither exogenous nor endogenous in their
makeup. They do not create a disinterested third party regulator (exogenous),
nor do they create an informal structure for nations to participate in regulation
from their own "privately ordered" positions (endogenous). These proposals
only serve to alienate those nations that do not agree with the harmonized
law- which in turn creates higher transaction costs for participating nations.
263 They may also determine whether the existence of antitrust law is a
good policy choice at all.
264 This posture, in and of itself, will create high transaction costs for a dis-
agreeing nation. The cost of compliance for such a nation is prohibitively
high- the nation perceives that its sovereignty will be lost. The subsequent
facilitation of such proposals therefore entails even higher transaction costs for
all nations involved. The lack of sufficient compliance would be one of the
leading transaction costs.
265 Regardless of origination- nation-based or created from abstract by a
group of nations.
266 Fox, supra note 229, at 6.
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may object and not follow the group of nations. 6 Harmoniza-
tion in the context of this backdrop, while not only quite diffi-
cult, would only capture a slanted vision of the antitrust issues.
Pro osals that structuralize positive comity fail in a similar
regard. s Structuralization is only as effective as the number of
nations that sign an international agreement or that unilaterally
decide to abide by the principle of positive comity. Regardless of
how many nations agree to positive comity, each nation still re-
tains discretion over whether to agree to extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion and the right to regulate international antitrust disputes in
which it receives comity. As with harmonization, these factors
allow nation-based antitrust bias to enter into the international
267 The economic concerns of disfavored nations are likely to be slight. If
the conduct of News Corporation is beneficial to the favored nation, but
harmful to the disfavored nation, the conduct is still likely to be approved.
The disfavored nation must absorb the negative externalities of the harmful
conduct. If the conduct of News Corporation is harmful to the favored na-
tion, yet beneficial to the disfavored nation, the conduct is likely to be disap-
proved. The disfavored nation must again absorb the negative externalities,
this time in the area of lost capital influx and growth opportunity. In such
cases transaction costs of implementing judgment, or even arriving at any satis-
factory judgment for all nations involved, would quickly rise-as the Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas and British Airways/American Airlines cases attest.
See supra note 260.
261 On the surface, structuralization acts as an endogenous governance
structure. Yet, for many reasons, structuralization falls short of eradicating the
transaction costs that true endogenous governance structures avoid. Struc-
turalization is simply too formal. Agreements institutionalizing positive com-
ity are exactly the type of "contracts" that endogenous governance structures
are designed to avoi. Each signing nation must fulfill the level of comity it
agrees upon in the contract. The formalized nature of this relationship runs
counter to the more flexible agreements that characterize endogenous govern-
ance structures. This formalization makes it more difficult for nations at the
bargaining table when negotiating a system of private ordering. Positive com-
ity agreements force nations to apply contract expectations and promises to
unforeseen situations. The difference between the contract expectation and the
private ordering creates transaction costs for all nations involved. This differ-
ence creates animosity, as one nation expects the other to perform some level
of regulation, and the other nation fails to live up to that expectation. This
breakdown too often creates an adversarial and hostile atmosphere between
nations. Obviously, the more that nations are involved in the agreement, the
more expectations are generated, the greater the transaction costs, and the
more tense the regulatory atmosphere. Endogenous relationships engender the
opposite- they are relationships, not contracts. Thus, each nation comes to
the bargaining table without any previously made promises or expectations.
269 In the context of an antitrust dispute, the cost of one nation acquiescing
to another is just too high in such a formalized agreement to expect efficient
compliance.
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antitrust calculus. Unless the participating nations are equally
powerful, a positive comity agreement will naturally favor one
nation over the other." When News Corporation's activities are
beneficial to the regulating nation (e.g., bringing in new services
or capital influx), that nation will be unlikely to grant or demand
comity- whatever the case may be. Additionally, not all the na-
tions affected by News Corporation's transactions may be cov-
ered by comity. To fully regulate the extent of News Corpora-
tion's anti-competitive transactions, a more international body of
participating nations is required.
A general set of antitrust principles suffers from similar fail-
ings. These proposals only encourage signers to implement and
enforce the desired principles.' All the nations that are affected
by News Corporation's conduct may not adopt the principles.
Even if these nations do adopt the principles, they may not im-
plement all of these principles. Even if the affected nations
choose to implement all of the principles, they may not choose to
enforce all of them (e.g., positive comity). ' 2 Enforcement in the
News Corporation situation could very well be a variable of
whether News Corporation's conduct economically benefits the
regulating country in an amount that overrides the cost of anti-
trust regulation. Even if all affected nations do in fact adopt and
enforce all the principles, News Corporation's acquisitions and
270 See Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International
Trade Cooperation, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 190, 200 (1999) (demonstrating via
economic modeling that "[t]he reason why bilateral enforcement is less effec-
tive than multilateral [trade regulation] enforcement is that, in each bilateral
relationship, the gains from cooperation accrue unevenly to the two part-
ners").
271 These proposals are not truly exogenous because they never transfer
decision-making power to a third party. Additionally, these proposals fail to
be endogenous because they force nations out of their own private ordering
and into a quasi-formalized structure of dispute settlement at a level that obvi-
ously creates its own transaction costs of compliance. Due to the discretionary
nature of the principles and the high transaction costs of implementing these
principles, many nations might choose not to participate at a level that would
make the regulatory structure efficient.
272 Adopting nations might choose only those principles that create low
transaction costs. The more costly provisions, such as positive comity (provi-
sions that have "antitrust bite") would gain only middling recognition. Thus,
similar to costs associated with the enforcement of harmonization, implemen-
tation of antitrust regulation would inure high transaction costs upon imple-
menting nations (i.e., these nations would essentially internalize the costs that
non-participating nations were unwilling to bear).
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conduct are still regulated from one nation's perspective- the
home (affected) nation. A regulating nation is less likely to rec-
ognize the extraterritorial anti-competitive effects (i.e., interna-
tional monopolization) of News Corporation's media entity ac-
quisition if that acquisition has beneficial or pro-competitive
effects in that regulating nation (e.g., new media services to the
consumer, capital influx, etc.).
6. A NEW VISION OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
As antitrust and competition regulators turn toward a rapidly
evolving technological matrix in the twenty-first century, one
dynamic is clear: to be effective, antitrust regulation must adapt
to changing international market structures more swiftly. No
longer do corporations march onward in the traditional tycoon
schematic. Multinational corporate conglomerates function at
many different business levels, in many different business forms,
and in many different countries. Although the state of the "anti-
trust nation" may be undisputed in that regard, a more challeng-
ing question is where to move from that understanding. It is ob-
vious that we simply can not use traditional nation-based antitrust
tactics to fight a guerilla-run business war. As previously de-
scribed, the attempts at moving in the direction of a more inter-
national antitrust scheme have been merely attempts. These at-
tempts have, however, furthered understanding of how difficult
any sort of international antitrust system is to achieve.
These actions and proposals have moved the collective anti-
trust concern forward, and more importantly, have begun to gain
a grip on the impact of monopolistic and anti-competitive behav-
ior on a global scale. A better understanding of previous legal
failings leads to a better construction of future legal entities. The
previous international antitrust proposals are limited for one very
simple reason- each proposal fails to think outside of its nation-
based bias. The next step for international antitrust is to move
beyond national boundaries.
To be more effective, a scheme of international antitrust regu-
lation must fully capture the international anti-competitive effects
of transactions by conglomerates like News Corporation. At the
same time, this new vision must be able to provide adequate
structural and behavioral international remedies. Simply stated,
"regulating antitrust at the national level is suboptimal, and an in-
ternational approach to antitrust is likely to be welfare increas-
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ing." 'S Imperative in any scheme of international antitrust regu-
lation is a system that has the ability to look at an international
market, reduce national bias, and produce confidence in the in-
ternational business community. The following section is a pro-
posal for an international antitrust solution. This proposal is in
turn applied to News Corporation.
6.1. Building upon Previous Proposals and Attempts
Previous proposals for a framework of international antitrust
regulation set out the obvious primary goal of international coop-
eration. Agreements structuralizing positive comity are a neces-
sary first step in achieving cooperation. Positive comity agree-
ments place nations in policy situations where they begin to learn
the mutually beneficial results of compliance.' As delineated
above, previous international antitrust proposals have used the ex-
isting structure of GATT as a starting point for international an-
titrust regulation.s These proposals understood the utility in
building acceptance for international antitrust regulation via the
conduit of a previously established acceptance of another interna-
tional organization. The beauty of working within the construct
of GATT is rather simple; establishing international antitrust
regulation thus only becomes a task of adding additional responsi-
bilities to an already existing mutually beneficial relationship and
legitimate dispute resolution mechanism. 6 The next step, merg-
273 Guzman, supra note 208, at 1504.
274 Efforts to harmonize antitrust law across national boundaries further a
different, yet important, aspect of the overall international antitrust project.
These efforts assist in the spread of the antitrust language throughout the in-
ternational business regulatory community. Without common language, any
sort of international antitrust regulatory structure is doomed to fail. Compli-
ance equals success.
275 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 229, at 8 (arguing for an international antitrust
agreement mirroring the TRIPs agreement on the trade-related aspects of intel-
lectual property, signed by GATT nations);see also Gifford, supra note 247, at
4 (detailing the Draft International Antitrust Code proposed by a group of an-
titrust scholars, which requires GATT nations to adopt minimum antitrust
regulatory standards).
276 Such construction, at least at the outset, theoretically helps eliminate
some modicum of transaction costs normally associated with international or-
ganizations. See discussion supra note 261 and accompanying text. This factor
provides an initial endogenous element to proposals that work from the
GATT construct. However, as was demonstrate in previous footnotes, there
are other reasons why previous proposals founded on this structure fail to ade-
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ing a competition policy focus into the WTO, has begun at a ba-
sic level. In 1996 the WTO itself set up a working group on the
Interaction of Between Trade and Competition Policy
("WGTCP"). By 1999, the WGTCP had moved closer to sug-
gesting some level of WTO multilateral framework for competi-
tion policy. Such proposals have been met with mixed reviews
about what form such framework would take and even on
whether such a framework is necessary at all. At this stage the
WTO appears stalled.' The authors' proposal, by underscoring
the acceptance and flexibility of the WTO, hopefully addresses
some of the concerns that have created this roadblock.
6.2. The Framework and Vehicle. The World Trade
Organization
The task set out is rather simple: 1) work in the GATT/WTO
construct and 2) eliminate nation-based antitrust bias. The WTO
continues the tradition of international cooperation in the area of
trade- a tradition begun by the GATT. Originally established in
1947 by an affiliation of a group of nations as an international
mechanism for resolution of tariff disputes, 8 the GATT has
evolved over the years" into an international institution whose
dispute resolution powers have grown beyond the original tariff
resolution directive. 2" Noted as the "principal international
agreement regulating trade between nations," 281 the GATT now
plays a prominent and respected role in the international business
and trade community- the heart of which is international trade
dispute resolution.282 In 1994, GATT member nations signed the
quately conquer the international antitrust matrix-namely eradicating the na-
tion-based bias from antitrust regulation.
27 See World Trade Organization, Trade and Competition Policy, Working
Group (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ministl/16comp e.
htm>.
278 See ERNsT-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 70 (1997).
279 See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3-15 (1999).
280 See PETERSMANN, supra note 278, at 71-72.
281 PIERRE PESCATORE, 1 HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 7 (1998).
282 See generally Hudec, supra note 279 (examining the, then current, state
of WTO's dispute resolution practice and procedure).
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agreement establishing the WTO, which now is the principal fo-
rum for resolution of trade disputes between nations.2 3 The
GATT existed for many years without any specifically delineated
organizational structure. The main thrust behind the establish-
ment of the WTO was to supply this needed structure and tie it
together with an enforceable dispute resolution mechanism.
284
The GATT/WTO schematic is ideal for the foundation of the
regulation of any international competition concern.285  GATT
established the underlying mutually beneficial international rela-
tionships. The WTO supplied a flexible organizational structure
from which to expand GATT's scope to additional international
trade issues. And, at the apex, the WTO added an effective dis-
pute resolution mechanism- giving legal legitimacy to the WTO
process. The basic WTO organizational structure consists of a
General Council and three specialized sub-councils. 286 The Gen-
283 See PESCATORE, supra note 281, at 7 (noting that "[t]he WTO has
taken over GATT's role as the principal international forum for trade negotia-
tions and dispute settlement").
284 See id. at 11-12.
25 At the level of underlying economic efficiency, it has been demon-
strated that the GATT dynamic merely is the manifestation of "simple rules
that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agree-
ments." Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, 89
AM. ECON. REV. 215, 215 (1999). Bagwell and Staiger note that "[a] trade
agreement can... promote a more efficient outcome for its member govern-
ments, if it serves as a means to eliminate the terms-of-trade-driven restrictions
in trade that arise when policies are set unilaterally." Id. at 216. Bagwell and
Staiger develop an economic model of GATT-a model based upon "recipro-
cal trade agreements," which promotes Nash equilibrium via the principles of
reciprocity of and non-discrimination in trade. id. at 219-37.
286 PESCATORE, supra note 281, at 12. The full description of the WTO
structure states,
The WTO provides the common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its members in matters covered by
the General Agreement and its side agreements, GATS and TRIPS
(the so-called Multilateral Trade Agreements). It is specifically pro-
vided that the Multilateral Trade Agreements are binding on all WTO
members. The WTO's main functions are to facilitate the operation
and further the objectives of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In
addition, it is charged with serving as a forum for international trade
negotiations and administering the dispute settlement system. The
WTO agreement provides that all decision-making powers shall be in
a Ministerial Conference, which is to be held every two years. In the
interim, those powers shall be exercised by the General Council,
which shall also function as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and
the Trade Policy Review Body. Under the General Council are three
specialized councils: The Council for Trade in Goods; the Council for
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eral Council of the WTO is empowered with expanding the scope
of WTO trade involvement.28 The sub-councils administer the
Multilateral Trade Agreements.28 For expansion of the WTO
coverage to international competition issues, the authors propose
the establishment of a new specialized sub-council: the Council
for Competition ("CFC") and a new Multilateral Trade Agree-
ment- to be administered by the new CFC- an agreement on
Competition, Antitrust, and Trade ("CAT").8 9
6.3. The Proposal. The WTO Councilfor Competition and
Agreement on Competition, Antitrust, and Trade
Not only must a proposal for international antitrust regula-
tion strive to eliminate nation-based bias, it must also provide a
regulatory environment that promotes healthy competition.
Currently, clarity and predictability are not hallmarks of antitrust
Trade in Services and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights. The specialized councils also have subsidiary
bodies.
The WTO agreement provides that the WTO shall continue the prac-
tice of decision making by consensus used by GATT in the past.
However, if a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the agree-
ment provides for voting on a one-country, one-vote basis, with ma-
jority rule unless otherwise provided. The WTO has three important
decision-making powers, each of which requires a super-majority vote.
First, by a vote of three-quarters of the members, the Ministerial Con-
ference and General Council have the right to adopt interpretations of
the WTO Agreement and the various Multilateral Trade Agreements.
... Second, the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have
the power to waive obligations under the WTO Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements, by a three-quarters vote if a consensus
decision cannot be reached .... Third, the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments may be amended under certain circumstances.
Id. at 12-14.
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 This proposal shares the direct underlying spirit of the international
antitrust proposal forwarded by Fox, the overarching principles proposal. See
supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text. Yet, in fnction, these two propos-
als are far from similar. Fox centers her proposal around the TRIPs and,
assumedly, the underlying WTO. However, the similarity ends at utilizing the
WTO, its organizational structure, and the tool of Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments. Fox's proposal, as this article points out, suffers from indeterminate
application, and concomitant room forpolitical abuse. See supra notes 271-72
and accompanying text. The proposal forwarded here moves beyond the fail-
ings of Fox's proposal, attempting to eliminate nation-based bias.
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law.29" This situation arguably allows sophisticated international
monopolists29 1 like News Corporation to go undetected, while, at
the same time, confusing and deterring less sophisticated, more
localized pro-competitive actors. Legal clarity and predictability
contribute to a setting in which better contracts and acquisitions
can be made- all of which in turn encourage investment at all
geographic market levels. Any system of international antitrust
regulation must provide clarity and predictability for businesses
and legal practitioners.
The proposed CFC and CAT together provide a solution.
The CFC itself would be comprised of representatives of WTO
member nations. Fundamentally important to the operation of
the CFC and adjudication of the CAT is that no international an-
titrust "code" would be adopted. The absence of any semblance
of an international antitrust code would allow the CFC to sustain
the benefits associated with integration into the structure of a mu-
tually beneficial international organization and would also elimi-
nate most of the nation-based bias. The CFC would be staffed
with antitrust regulators from all member nations ("FC staffers").
These regulators would have two responsibilities: case distribu-
tion and case investigation. Each regulator would be allowed to
work from the understanding of his or her home country's anti-
trust/competition law.
The CFC could also serve as an expert arbitral organization,
providing appointed qualified panel members (selected similar to
the dispute resolution panel members) as arbitrators. In keeping
with the goals of consistency and predictability, these arbitrators
would apply traditional rules of International Chamber of Com-
merce arbitration. The CFC could be either designated in con-
tracts as an antitrust arbitral entity or retained after antitrust dis-
putes arise.
Actual antitrust regulation by the CFC would occur in the
following manner. For international transactions of a certain
size, or international business conduct by an actor of a certain
290 See generally Derek Devgun, Crossboarder Joint Ventures: A Survey of In-
ternationalAntitrust Considerations, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 681, 685 (1996)
(noting that "[a]ntitrust law in the 1990s [has] consist[ed] of a vast and complex
maze of rules and policies.").
291 International monopolists not only have a business strategy that eludes
traditional antitrust norms, but they also have a business structure that is dis-
parate and complex enough to disguise true entity control.
2000]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
size, a team of CFC staffers would first determine what the most
relevant geographic market is for the transaction or conduct at is-
sue. This team would consist equally of regulators from techno-
logically developed, developing, and undeveloped nations.
If the antitrust concerns were only nation-based, the team,
with the approval of a CFC standing committee (a rotating panel
of five CFC national members), would forward the case directly
to the regulatory authority in the nation of concern. Standard
WTO dispute resolution would be available for appeal of this de-
cision or appeal of the final national regulatory decision. If the
antitrust concerns were on any international level, the affected
nations' antitrust regulators would be invited to investigate the
transaction in parallel with a group of disinterested CFC staffers.
If all member states were interested parties to the transaction, an
even contribution would be made between beneficially and det-
rimentally affected nations to the entire CFC investigation team.
The entire group would make a final recommendation to a CFC
panel (comprised of three disinterested national CFC representa-
tives), who then in turn would make a final determination and
decree. This CFC panel would have multiple means of sanc-
tion- structural, behavioral, and financial. The panel would also
be empowered to defer sanction to particular nations or groups of
nations. The legal power of the decree would be enforced
through member state reciprocity, similar to current WTO trade
resolutions.292 Appeals by WTO member nations would be made
292 How nations arrive at a position in which they accept such phantom
judgments- judgments that carry no direct enforcement power- is fascinating.
The growing acceptance of arbitral agreements, U.N. resolutions, and WTO
trade resolutions have all followed a similar path. In lay terms, under concepts
of reciprocity, nations move towards a position of acceptance when they real-
ize an "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine" attitude. Giovanni Maggi
performs a much more technical, economic-based analysis of this very situation
at the level of multilateral international institutions. See Giovanni Maggi, The
Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 190 (1999). Maggi specifically analyzes the WTO; in turn, he con-
structs an economic model ol a multilateral trade institution, "examin[ing] two
potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution: first, verifying violations of
the agreements and informing third parties, thus facilitating multilateral repu-
tation mechanisms; second, promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather
than a web of bilateral negotiations." Id. at 190. Working with game theory
and Nash equilibria, Maggi demonstrates that "[t]he gains from multilateral en-
forcement [of trade regulation]... can be thought of as gains from exchanging
enforcement power across bilateral relationships. There also may be gains
from aggregating enforcement power in the trading system." Id. at 208. Maggi
also concludes that multilateral trade regulation enforcement internalizes ex-
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to the WTO itself via the current standard dispute resolution
mechanism.
This proposal sets forth an ideal framework. It is unrealistic
to believe, however, that even a WTO enacted international anti-
trust regime could be implemented at the outset with wide-
ranging force. Rather, the proposal is forwarded here to demon-
strate the possibilities that the WTO may pose for an ultimate in-
ternational antitrust solution. If some form of this proposal were
adopted, implementation would most likely have to occur at a
gradual pace. With respect to the WTO generally, the nations of
the world gradually have accepted and recognized the true bene-
fits of a mutually beneficial international trade regulatory body
(GATT/WTO). The WTO dispute resolution mechanism em-
bodies and structuralizes this evolved international commit-
ment- yet, the mechanism is young, and its force is still tenta-
tive. Similarly, gradual acceptance and recognition are the only
promising routes for true international antitrust.293 Just as with
the acceptance and growing reciprocity of commercial arbitra-
tion, nations will slowly realize the economic benefits of full par-
ticipation in a non-nation-based system of international antitrust
regulation. Recognizing that actual implementation of the pro-
posal will take many years, the proposal is next applied in the ab-
ternalities normally associated with bilateral negotiation of trade regulation
rulemaking. See id. at 209. Maggi concludes with an assertion that the
GATT/WTO has been efficient in the manner described by his model. Maggi
notes:
There is some evidence that the GATT has effectively promoted a
multilateralization of the bargaining process in recent decades .... A
more controversial question is whether the activity of GATT's dis-
pute settlement procedure has improved the enforcement of trade
agreements in the way that the model suggests .... There are several
examples of GATT disputes in which there was a clear imbalance of
power between the disputants, and the DSP panel ruled in favor of the
weaker country....
Id. Maggi's model, analysis, and conclusions are quite helpful. His work indi-
cates that the GATT/WTO construct very well may be effective in eliminating
nation-based bias- which would result in weaker countries being "oppressed"
by stronger nations. As the result seems to be the opposite, GATT/WTO
may be able to cut through the nation-based bias of a consortium of antitrust
regulators, balancing interests via this dynamic of reciprocity in a game-theory
construct.
293 Actual implementation of the proposal herein would most likely begin
at some quasi-regulatory level, ultimately moving from the discretionary realm
to adjudication with more force.
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stract to News Corporation, demonstrating the power potentiali-
ties for such a proposal.
6.4. Applying the Proposal to News Corporation
While the CFC has no substantive law, it would still engender
antitrust regulatory confidence. By providing a clear procedural
system of regulation for international business transactions and
activity, the CFC, like other WTO constructs currently already
do, would give businesses the certainty they need to calculate the
timing of business transactions. By guaranteeing that no conflict-
ing antitrust judgments exist (as the CFC would be the only body
authorized to make a decree in any international antitrust case),
businesses would gain confidence that transactions in one nation
would not be foreclosed in others (e.g., no asset freeze). The
WTO dispute resolution mechanism would cement this climate
of certainty. The availability of an expert body of antitrust arbi-
trators may encourage more parties to choose to include antitrust
arbitral clauses in their contracts. Overall, this arbitral activity
would add to the consistency of antitrust law. Due to growing
business confidence, the mere existence of CFC antitrust arbitra-
tion may encourage more parties to do business.
The CFC minimizes nation-based antitrust regulatory bias
and eliminates choice-of-law issues. By allowing each regulator to
represent the concerns of his or her home country (without guid-
ance from an international antitrust code), truly international
regulatory scrutiny results. The CFC essentially removes the na-
tional discretionary function from positive comity and places
comity power in a deliberative environment with disinterested
and interested parties sharing decision-making power. This amal-
gamation would hopefully capture, as closely as possible, the
broad-range of anti- and pro-competitive effects resulting from
News Corporation's transactions. Extreme, nation-based, inter-
ested party views would cancel each other out.
A CFC type organization would see the international anti-
competitive effects of News Corporation's acquisitions and con-
duct. A CFC type organization would also be more likely to
move conceptions of the antitrust calculus beyond current nation-
based confines and into a realm of analysis that begins to concep-
tualize international product and geographic markets without us-
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ing national boundaries as a guide.294 After all, News Corporation
operates with this understanding of the relevant international
market in which its vertically integrated broadcast-media distribu-
tion network holds actual monopoly power. If News Corpora-
tion operates in this manner, why should regulators do other-
wise?
7. CONCLUSION
With its vertically integrated media distribution network,
News Corporation has exclusive ownership and dominion over
an unparalleled conduit without which consumers across the
world could not access a myriad of broadcast-media products.
Quite simply, News Corporation monopolizes media distribu-
tion. When News Corporation purchases an entity in a certain ju-
risdiction, it adds to its extensive network, further entrenching its
international monopoly. Much of this distribution network is
founded upon a backbone of sports-media.
The News Corporation confounds the traditional nation-
based antitrust paradigm. News Corporation's broadcast-media
distribution, marketing, and support network is highly vertically
integrated and spreads horizontally throughout the world. Na-
tion-based antitrust regulation, regardless of extraterritorial ar-
rangements, is naturally bound to focus upon national anti-
competitive concerns. Nation-based antitrust analysis of News
Corporation is likely to follow this pattern. The only way to
truly capture the anti-competitive effects of News Corporation
actions is via an international filter. The filter of the WTO offers
294 The International Antitrust Clearinghouse acts as a hybrid exogenous
and endogenous governance structure. In an abstract sense, a third party re-
solves disputes, even though each nation participates in the "third party" by
contributing representatives. The third party retains independence via the
sheer number of opinions that go into any particular case. While the founda-
tion and structure of the International Antitrust Clearinghouse is exogenous,
the way it functions and substantively regulates is very much endogenous. As
the nations directly affected by suspect conduct/transactions participate in
resolution, this participation allows for endogenous "private ordering." Thus,
nations are not subject to a pure "contract ap lication" of international law.
Without any'set "contract" containing applicagle substantive law, nations are
encouraged to participate so as to maintain their own sovereignty, forwarding
their own national interests involved in any particular antitrust case. The ap-
plicable substantive law will be the confluence of these interests. As such, each
case is an exercise in informal decision-making, the results being an expression
of "private ordering," not the applicability of an individual nation's law or a
particular harmonized law.
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this opportunity. To do otherwise is to regulate with a phantom
fist, all the while allowing one entity to gain dangerous and chill-
ing control over the international broadcast-media market.
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